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THE UNREST IN BENGAL
AND
MR. MORLEY'S REFORMS.

(Articles reprinted from the Hindu Patriot)
(2nd October 1907)

BY

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HINDU PATRIOT.

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UNREST IN BENGAL.

I.

"AN APPEAL."

THE state of unrest in Bengal has for some time been a matter of deep concern to those of our countrymen who have a real stake in the country. It cannot be denied that this unrest owes its origin to want of sympathy between the rulers and the ruled. It is useless to enquire into its origin at present, but it is the imperative duty of all well-wishers of our country to allay this unrest. It is doing great harm. It is calculated to alienate the people from the Government. The British Indian Association has been considering for sometime what measures should be adopted to improve the present situation. An influential Conference was held to determine this question. The conference was of opinion that noblemen and gentlemen who have no sympathy with violent utterances in the press and on the platform, should, in the interest of good government, at once dissociate themselves from such demonstrations against Government and should appeal to the people to assume an attitude of restraint and moderation. There are grave defects in the administrative system, it is true, but they cannot be removed by a display of sedition and disaffection, and by having recourse to violent proceedings. It is by sober and well-reasoned representation as well as by constitutional agitation that the evils of the present system can be eradicated. The people have now aspirations and ideas which do not at all harmonise with the bureaucratic institutions adopted by our Government. But it should be at

once understood that violence in any shape is hostile to the attainment of the objects we aim at. The Conference came to the decision that an earnest "Appeal" should be issued to our countrymen to refrain from expressing sentiments of rancour and ill-feeling towards the Government and display restraint and moderation in their acts and utterances. The gentlemen present at the meeting emphatically deprecated repressive measures, but they were sure that such measures would cease to exist as soon as people realised the real situation. The "Appeal" was drawn up and it was formally adopted by the British Indian Association, and a resolution was passed that leading representatives of the different classes of the community should be invited to sign it. All the Maharajas of the Province, ten leading Rajas, three Knights, twenty-eight Rai Bahadurs, thirty-two prominent zemindars and landholders, leading lawyers and merchants, well-known graduates of the University and other University men, in all 107 leading men of our community, have signed the "Appeal" which we publish elsewhere. It is hoped that it would have a most salutary effect.

10-8.

(II.)

In commenting upon the "Appeal" issued by our leading men of wealth, influence, position and culture, the *Bengalee* remarks that while the signatories appeal to the people to be moderate and eschew violence of language, they have apparently no appeal to make to Government. The "manifesto," as it is called, has the fault of "onesidedness," and will, therefore, in the opinion of the paper, have no effect upon those whom it is desired to influence. The *Amrita Bazar Patrika* goes a step further and points out the way in which the appeal should have been worded. "What the signatories should have done," it says, "was to tell the rulers that, while the people are grateful to the British Government for what it

has done, they do not deserve the unsympathetic treatment which is now being accorded to them. In short, they should have condemned the policy of repression which has created such seething discontent in the land, and which is the real cause of the unrest. If they had done it, their appeal would have produced effect upon their countrymen."

Both our contemporaries have misunderstood the object and the spirit of the 'Appeal.' They should have seen the object which the signatories had in view. The "Appeal" is addressed to those of our countrymen whose feelings are excited, and who, by their action and utterances, are causing the present unrest. The duty of allegiance is pointed out, and an attitude of restraint and moderation is advised. The "Appeal" is addressed to brothers, friends, followers and dependents who think that their honor is outraged, that their rights are trampled under foot, and that their aspirations and ideas are totally disregarded. Violent language is used, and violent proceedings are resorted to for redressing their wrongs. When feelings are excited and the popular conduct is disorderly, the natural course to adopt is to implore our brethren to follow dictates of reason, to advise them to restrain their conduct, to ask them to calmly consider their relations with the Government, and to act in obedience to the law of the land.

The signatories are fully aware that the defects of the present system of administration and the alleged unsympathetic treatment of our rulers have created the present situation; but what they had to consider is the action they should take to allay the present unrest. They felt that if the people realised their position and approached Government in proper spirit, the present situation would be materially improved. It is complained that all our representations are disregarded, and that not the slightest heed is paid to our beliefs, sentiments and wants. We do not deny that the

policy of the Government has not been what it ought to be in promoting the best interests of the people. But knowing the attitude of the Government and the real situation of the people, what are our leaders to do? Their duty, first of all, is to appeal to their friends and to the people in general to restore harmony and good-will, to act strictly according to law, and to implicitly obey the mandates of the sovereign body. We do not mean to say that the people should obey unconditionally every mandate of persons in authority. Only an unmitigated despotism demands such obedience. We mean such mandates only as are general and issued in the deliberate form of laws. When the people are law-abiding, are restrained in their conduct, and show proper respect to constituted authority, no enlightened Government can ever fail to adopt measures to promote the well-being of the people under their charge. Principles of Political Philosophy teach us that Government altogether is only a means; the eligibility of the means must depend on their adaptation to the end. Government abrogates its proper functions when its efforts are not directed towards securing and safe-guarding our real interests.

We have shown above why the signatories have elected to appeal to the people only and not to the people and the Government. Had the two appeals been mixed together, they would have been incongruous. They would not have harmonised. The "Appeal" to the people was necessarily "one-sided." There was no place in it in which the sentiments of the signatories about coercion and repression might be expressed with propriety. Mere expression of opinion regarding repressive measures would not have been of the slightest avail. Such expression of opinion, considering the nature of the appeal and the character of the party to whom it is addressed, would have been completely out of place in the document under notice. Had it been addressed to the Government, the repressive measures which have inflamed

the passions of the people and are doing positive mischief, would not only have been severely condemned, but Government, we are sure, would have been implored to withdraw them at once in their own interest, if for nothing else, and their prayer might have had a most beneficial effect. But such prayer in the present "Appeal" was wisely thought to be inopportune, and was, therefore, not made.

12-8.

(III.)

The Criterion of a Good Form of Government

MR. MORLEY, in his Budget speech, speaking of the impolicy and inexpediency of applying a political principle in any sort of circumstances without reference to conditions, quotes Mill and says that "Government by a dominant country is as legitimate as any other, if it is the one which in the existing state of civilisation of the subject people, most facilitates their transition *to our state of civilisation*." The last few words in italics are not those of Mill. The words used by him are 'to a higher stage of improvement.' It is not quite clear why Mr. Morley has changed Mill's words. Our ideas of a higher stage of improvement are quite different from those of English people regarding the present state of their civilisation. It is very doubtful whether it is desirable that India should ever attain the present state of English civilisation. The Indian standard of civilisation is of a character entirely different from that of the English standard. We can never conceive of a time when our countrymen would strive to reach a state of civilisation, which would even remotely approach the state of civilisation of our rulers. Our traditions are different from those of the dominant people. Indian political improvement must be based upon our past institutions. Our present beliefs and sentiments are moulded, it is true, by foreign

influence, but they are the products of the past, and do largely partake of the qualities of their origin. It should never be the aim of dominant people to impose their beliefs, laws and institutions upon the subject country. If our rulers ever try to do so, their efforts are doomed to failure. Domination of England, in the present condition of our country, is certainly legitimate. But the clear duty of the governing country, is, in the language of Mill, to conduct the system of Government in such a way that India may gradually be led to a higher stage of improvement.

Our readers must not suppose that Mr. Morley, in defending his bureaucratic measures, has correctly quoted the views of Mill in support of his arguments. The quotation he has given is disjointed. There are many qualifying remarks which have been entirely omitted. In saying that the governing country, failing to lead the people under its charge to a higher stage of improvement, "is guilty of a dereliction of the highest moral trust that can devolve upon a nation," the Secretary of State has entirely left out the concluding part of the sentence in which the foregoing remarks occur. We will supply the omission. The sentence thus concludes,—"*and if they do not even aim at it, they are selfish usurpers, on a par in criminality with any of those whose ambition and rapacity have sported from age to age with the destiny of masses of mankind.*" Why the sentence has been mutilated, and these pregnant words have been left out, we leave our readers to judge.

Our space does not permit us to quote in full all the weighty remarks of Mill on the system of Government adopted by the British people in India. We will give here only one more quotation. It is as follows :—

"Among a people like that of India, the utmost efforts of the public authorities are not enough for the effectual protection of the weak against the strong ; and of all the strong the European

settlers are the strongest. Wherever the demoralizing effect of the situation is not in a most remarkable degree corrected by the personal character of the individual, they think the people of the country mere dirt under their feet : it seems to them monstrous that any rights of the natives should stand in the way of their smallest pretensions : the smallest act of protection to the inhabitants against any act of power on their part which they may consider useful to their commercial objects, they denounce, and sincerely regard as an injury. So natural is this state of feeling in a situation like theirs, that even under the discouragement which it has hitherto met with from the ruling authorities, it is impossible that more or less of the spirit should not perpetually break out. The Government, itself free from this spirit, is never able sufficiently to keep it down in the young and raw even of its own civil and military officers, over whom it has so much more control than over the independent residents."

These words require no comment from us. They are as true now as they were forty-six years ago when they were first published. The philosopher with a true prevision foresaw the great difficulties which the foreign governors, even under direct control of the Crown, would experience in effectually ruling a country like India. Can it be wondered now why there is unrest in India, especially in Bengal? The most mysterious question in the whole movement, says an English critic, which puzzles, and, to a certain extent, dismays, the most experienced Anglo-Indians, is why it should have occurred at the present moment. "An electric vibration is evidently passing over the Peninsula, but its cause is absolutely invisible." No, the cause is not invisible. The cause is that the measures adopted by the Government to secure our well-being, are inadequate. Security of life and of property may be given to us. Education may have developed our moral and intellectual qualities. The country may, in some measure, enjoy material prosperity. We may live in comfortable circumstances, our person and possessions may be protected by a strong hand, and we may even be educated in western learning. This is not enough to

secure and safe-guard our complete well-being. There is no scope in the present system of Government for full development of our active qualities. Let us hear what the great philosopher, at whose lamp of wisdom and humanity all students of political philosophy have kindled their modest rush-lights, says on the subject :

“It is always under great difficulties and very imperfectly, that a country can be governed by foreigners ; even when there is no extreme disparity, in habits and ideas, between the rulers and the ruled. Foreigners do not feel with the people. They cannot judge, by the light in which a thing appears to their own minds, or the manner in which it affects their feelings, how it will affect the feelings or appear to the minds of the subject population. What a native of the country, of average practical ability, knows as it were by instinct, they have to learn slowly, and after all imperfectly, by study and experience. The laws, the customs, the social relations, for which they have to legislate, instead of being familiar to them from childhood, are all strange to them. For most of their detailed knowledge they must depend on the information of natives ; and it is difficult for them to know whom to trust. They are feared, suspected, probably disliked by the population ; seldom sought by them except for interested purposes ; and they are prone to think that the servilely submissive are the trust-worthy. Their danger is of despising the natives ; that of the natives is, of disbelieving that any thing the strangers do can be intended for their good.”

We commend these remarks of the greatest political philosopher of the present age to the authorities. They afford ample food for reflection.

15-8.

(IV.)

The Criterion of a Good Form of Government.

WE quoted Mill in our last to point out under what formidable difficulties India is being governed by our foreign rulers.

These difficulties are almost insuperable in their nature. There is unrest in our province; there is deep discontent in the country, because the measures that are adopted to mitigate them, instead of affording any relief, only tend to inflame the passions of the people. Ordinances are issued, coercion is resorted to, to restore law and order in the land. These Draconian ordinances are not obeyed, and coercion in every shape is resented and resisted. A Government that fails to enforce its ordinances, and which has only repressive measures to put down unrest, cannot be said to govern in the proper sense of the word. The cause of dissatisfaction and discontent must be effectually removed, the root of the evils which have originated the present situation must be destroyed, before we can expect peace and harmony re-established in the country. There is talk of sedition, there is talk of disaffection. Determination is expressed to maintain British prestige. But those who advise the Government to crush out sedition and disaffection, never for a moment consider that the hydra-headed monster, if it does really exist, can never be killed, if the source from which its vitality is replenished is not dried up. All that the word prestige implies has, under present conditions, no substantial substratum. It has only a shadowy existence. Every one talks glibly of it, but no one understands its real nature. Many crimes are committed in its name. It is a malignant fetish, which claims enormous sacrifices. Persistence in acknowledged error can never be seriously maintained to be prestige. Such persistence in error has given rise to the present deplorable situation.

Evils there are, and a remedy must be discovered to eradicate them. Such remedy is found in a *good form of Government*. We use the words deliberately and with a full consciousness of their import. We acknowledge the benefits of British rule, we appreciate the blessings of modern civilisation. But we maintain that the form of Government which is

essentially suited to secure and safeguard our well-being, is wanting in the present machinery. It may appropriately be asked, "what then is the criterion, in our opinion, of a good form of Government?" We shall again be guided by the views expressed by Mill on the subject, and then there will remain but a feeble chance of our being denounced as visionaries. If we ask ourselves, says he, on what causes and conditions good government, in all its senses, from the humblest to the most exalted, depends, we find that the principal of them, the one which transcends all others, is the qualities of the human beings composing the society over which the Government is exercised. The first element of good Government, therefore, he continues, being the virtue and intelligence of the human beings composing the community, the most important point of excellence which any form of Government can possess, is to promote the virtue and intelligence of the people themselves. The first question in respect to any political institutions is, how far they tend to foster in the members of the community the various desirable qualities, moral and intellectual; or rather (following Bentham's more complete classification) moral, intellectual, and active. The Government which does this the best, has every likelihood of being the best in all other respects, since it is on these qualities, so far as they exist in the people, that all possibility of goodness in the practical operations of the government depends.

"We may consider, then, as one criterion of the goodness of a Government, the degree in which it tends to increase the sum of good qualities in the governed, collectively and individually; since, besides that their well-being is the sole object of government, their good qualities supply the moving force which works the machinery. This leaves, as the other constituent element of the merit of a government, the quality of the machinery itself; that is, the degree in which it is adapted to take advantage of the amount of good qualities which may at any time exist, and make them instrumental to the right purposes."

All government, we read, which aims at being good, is an organisation of some part of the good qualities existing in the individual members of the community, for the conduct of its collective affairs. "A representative constitution is a means of bringing the general standard of intelligence and honesty existing in the community and the individual intellect and virtue of its present members, more directly to bear upon the government and investing them with greater influence in it than they would in general have under any other mode of organisation."

We have already shown that the first duty of a Government is to bring the people which it governs to a higher state of improvement. In this connection, it should never be forgotten that in all states of human improvement ever yet attained, according to writers of eminence, the nature and degree of authority exercised over individuals, the distribution of power and the conditions of command and obedience, are the most powerful of the influences, except their religious belief, which make them what they are and enable them to become what they can be.

It will be seen from the above what are the requisites of a good form of Government. The members mainly constituting the Government must not be foreigners, unacquainted with the beliefs, sentiments, wants, institutions and practices, of the people, but members of the communities which are governed. They must be the best men of the country governed, men having pre-eminently the qualities known as industry, integrity, justice and prudence. They must be natives of excellence both intellectual and moral. Let them by all means be under the moral guidance of their rulers, if the latter are qualified, by their superior intelligence and training, to exercise their legitimate influence. But the country must be left to its own enlightened devices to know and protect its own best interests, and provide for its own well-being. We

must come out of leading strings and refuse to be governed or treated like children. We are not treated as enlightened men of ability and culture should be ; on the contrary, our wants are not supplied, our ideas of improvement disregarded and our legitimate aspirations entirely ignored. This is the real cause of discontent. Remove it, and with the removal of the root of the evil, the discontent of the country will disappear.

16-8.

V.

Popular Effervescence.

WE quoted high authority to establish our position that Government of a people by itself is of a different character from the Government of one people by another. The latter is surrounded by enormous difficulties and must be properly protected and guarded. The philosopher, who by his writings has exercised the widest and deepest influence on modern thought, uses strong language—language which we do not venture to repeat. "One people," says he, "may keep another as a warren or preserve for its own use, a place to make money in, a human cattle-farm to be worked for the profit of its own inhabitants. But if the good of the governed is the proper business of the governor, it is utterly impossible that a (foreign) people should directly attend to it. The utmost they can do is to give some of their best men a commission to look after it..." We dare not go so far as the great writer does, but what we do mean to say is that if the sole object of the Government is to secure the well-being of the governed people, to lead the governed country to a higher stage of civilisation, then proper arrangements should be made to attain the desired end. Proper safe-guards, selected with care and judgment, must be provided. These safe-guards are not hard

to find, nor difficult to use. With some discrimination and a little circumspection they can be employed with great benefit. Take our best men--men who by their position, influence, experience and culture are fitted to give advice--into your confidence. Act up to their advice, and employ, under superior guidance, natives of cultivated intelligence, practical virtue, recognised culture and trained energy, in all departments of State, and the object you aim at will be gained. In the proposed Advisory Council of Notables the course we have indicated may be followed, if mature judgment is brought to bear upon the selection of the men composing the Council. Their advice in the government of the country would simply be invaluable. But if the members be only princes and chiefs who are not in touch with the people of the British territories; if our natural leaders are not given seats in the Council, we do not for a moment hesitate to say that the Council will be doomed to failure.

In answer to the question why are not the great general principles, enunciated by philosophers and statesmen of acknowledged authority, applied to the solution of Indian political problems, we are told that an exception should be made in the case of India, because she is not fit to govern herself. We are told that the people of India are composite, heterogeneous, with different histories, of different races, and different faiths. Yes, these are the shibboleths we know of the party adverse to our advancement, and determined to keep this country under leading strings. If provinces be separately taken and administered, as they are roughly governed at present, the fault of compositeness, heterogeneousness, different traditions and different faiths will be felt to have but a feeble effect on the application of the great principles mentioned above. The Supreme Government, constituted on an enlightened basis, can, as it is expected to do now, bring the whole administration into a consistent whole. The history of the British Parliament

teaches us that different races within the British Isles, composite and heterogeneous, of different traditions and different faiths, can all be welded together, can be formed into one nation, and can be brought under the subjection of one general body of laws with only local variations. The doctrinal differences, politically considered, between Hindu and Mahomedan religions are not, we are led to suppose, greater than those between the different sections of the Christian faith. If the latter could be reconciled with each other, the former would, we feel sure, present no insurmountable difficulties to deal with under an uniform body of political institutions. Those who are determined to be blind can easily delude themselves and delude the subject people by screening their actions under specious but radically vicious theories.

The Secretary of State, at the conclusion of his Budget speech, says, with evident sincerity, that the British Government is not doing what it has done for its own interest, but for the interest of the millions committed to its care, "and we ought to face them," he continues, "with sympathy, with kindness, with firmness, with a love of justice, and whether the weather be fair or foul, in a valiant and hopeful spirit." Cheers greeted these noble words of the speaker, and well they may be so cheerfully accepted. These are fine words, it is true, but the speaker is well aware that fine words alone do not form the pabulum for mental nutriment; they must be leisurely, but strictly, followed by actions--actions which will unerringly show the sincerity of the Government. The speaker must have been told by this time that the measures of reform he proposes will not satisfy the Indian people. They must be so modified as to supply our wants. He should never forget the words of his great master that to the strenuous exertions and the enlightened spirit of the people must be commended the care of their own destiny. We say with the speaker that "the British rule will continue, ought to continue, and must conti-

nue." We are as much opposed to anarchy and bloody chaos as he is, but we say with a full heart and with a full consciousness of the significance of our utterances, that British rule ought to continue and must continue in India, if it is firmly based on the affections of the people, and if it is unerringly guided by the immutable principles, which have been accepted by the British people in conducting a Government.

Our inimical critics loudly assert that the present state of unrest has been brought about by violent utterances in the Press and on the platform ; that if these utterances are silenced, the existing unrest will at once be allayed. This is a grave mistake and should at once be rectified. The unrest has a deeper root, and does not depend on any accidental cause or causes. These causes of popular unrest have been accumulating for years, ever since, in fact, the establishment of British rule. The Mutiny of the mercenary Sepoy Army has been explained by the story of greased cartridges. Keen observers know that this is but a fictitious explanation, and that the uprising at that time was due to far other causes. This was a revolt of brute force for redressing true or imaginary wrongs inflicted by a strong but despotic Government. The unrest we now witness is of a different nature. The present unrest originated among the cultured people, and was communicated through them to the lower strata of society. We hear now only the mutterings of dissatisfaction. Our speakers and writers have only given a voice to popular dissatisfaction. The dissatisfaction is all there, imbedded in the inner constitution of the nation. There is now an intellectual revolt against the inferiority of our position resulting from the broken pledges of a bureaucratic Government. Ideas about our wrongs,—call them fancied if you like,—have existed in the minds of the cultured people for a long time. These ideas have long been in a liquefied

condition—our orators and writers have solidified them. Partition destroyed our solidarity, and furnished an occasion for showing that constitutional agitation has serious draw-backs. We maintain that evils have long been gathering strength. Partition has brought them to the surface, and they have been made manifest by popular demonstrations. A musical note is in the air long before it is brought to our knowledge and appreciated by our sentiments. But it is there and its electric vibration is distinctly felt. A Handel or a Beethoven, a Jayadeva or a Tansen, catches the shadow, invokes the melody, and calls into being the symphony of the soul. Thousands drink in the nectar of their ravishing strains in enraptured silence. A Burke or a Sheridan, a Ramgopal, a Keshab Chandra or a Surendra Nath gives only a visible form to ideas, which have been lying dormant in the minds of the people. They merely voice, as we have said, popular ideas and popular feelings. Our newspapers have not created the situation. They merely reflect public opinion. Prosecution or persecution of our public speakers and writers may silence them for a time; but there is a perennial fountain in which these ideas and aspirations have their birth, and unless it is dried up, mutterings will be heard, unrest will continue, the existing situation will be aggravated, and bitter feelings will have an accession of strength. The train is laid. There is smouldering fire. It behoves British statesmen now to read correctly the signs of the times, and to see that the smouldering fire is not converted into a conflagration. The millennium foreseen by Macaulay has not yet arrived in vivid light, but the popular mind is stirred, and it is the imperative duty of our statesmen to take note that coercion is but a singularly weak instrument in crushing out the intellectual revolt of a nation. Brute force, as is well-known, is powerless in meeting and dealing effectually with the present crisis.

APPENDIX A.

AN APPEAL.

It has been a matter of deep concern to us to observe the growing discontent of the people of this country, which has lately manifested itself in certain quarters in violent speeches and newspaper articles. We desire at once to dissociate ourselves from these demonstrations, which only tend to alienate the Government and the people from each other. It would of course be futile to pretend that the horizon of politics is cloudless. We have arrived at one of those periodical crises which arise in every country and which are beneficial to it or the reverse according to the manner in which they are met. It is a crisis which calls for deep and earnest reflection on both sides, and not for noisy or violent declamation. The crying need of the moment is amity and good feeling between the various communities, whole-hearted sympathy on the part of the rulers for the people under their charge, and co-operation on the part of all who have the real interest of the country at heart. It has been grievous to us to find so much energy and patriotism diverted into wrong channels, and we cannot too strongly condemn the tone and temper displayed by certain journals, both English and Indian, which have exercised an influence hostile in the last degree to the promotion of friendly feelings among different sections of the community. There has been more than one disagreement in the past between popular sentiment in India and the policy which the Government has seen fit to pursue, but those disagreements have never led to any serious estrangement or proved otherwise than helpful by throwing light upon administrative problems and eventually bringing the two parties to a better mutual understanding. We firmly believe that such will be the outcome of the present situation, if the same qualities of restraint and moderation on one side and consideration for public opinion on the other are brought to bear upon it, which have saved it more than once in days gone-by. We venture to assert that the bulk of the people of the country are loyal and law-abiding. We

now appeal to our countrymen, Hindus and Mahomedans, for a display of the practical good sense which some of our critics deny to us. We appeal to them to discountenance any wild and mischievous propaganda which tends to encourage disaffection to British rule, or to create feelings of animosity between different classes and communities in India : for it is this tendency which furnishes the occasion and the excuse for the repressive measures which have recently been resorted to. Nor must we forget that whatever may be its shortcomings, it is to British rule that we owe our present security of life and property, the spread of education and the progress which India is now making according to modern civilized ideals. This is emphatically the worst possible time to encourage unworthy sentiments of rancour and ill-feeling. No true patriot will hesitate to range himself, with us, on the side of law and order at the present juncture, so as, on the one hand, to restore the goodwill and harmony which formerly prevailed among all classes and communities in India and, on the other hand, to leave the authorities no ground for bringing coercion to bear upon any group of British subjects.

Bejoychand Mahtab, (Maharajadhiraj Bahadur) of Burdwan, Rameswara Sing, (K.C.I.E.), (The Hon'ble Maharaja Bahadur Sir) of Durbhanga, Ravaneswarprosad Singh, (K.C.I.E.), (Maharaja Bahadur, Sir) of Gidhour, Joteendra Mohan Tagore, (K.C.S.I.) (Maharaja Bahadur Sir), Girijanath Roy, (The Hon'ble Maharaja Bahadur) of Dinajpur, Manindrachandra Nandi, (Maharaja) of Cossimbazar, Suryyakanta Acharyya Chaudhuri, (Maharaja), of Mymensingh, Kumudchandra Singh, (Maharaja), of Susang, Chandramadhub Ghose, (Kt.) (Sir), Sourindra Mohun Tagore, (Kt.) (Raja, Sir) (C.I.E.), Baikunthanath De, (Raja Bahadur) of Balasore, Ranajit Sinha, (Raja Bahadur) of Nashipur, Bunbehari Kapur, (C.S.I.) (The Hon'ble Raja), Peary Mohun Mookerji, (M.A., B.L. C.S.I.) (Raja), Ramranjan Chuckerbutty, (Raja Bahadur) of Hitampur, Mukunda Deb, (Raja) of Puri, Pramathabhusari Deb Roy, (Raja Naldanga), Benoy Krishna Deb, (Raja), Shibchunder Banerji, (B.L.), (Raja) of Bhagulpore, Jogendranarain Roy, (Raja) of Lalgola, Gopendra Krishna Deb, (M.A., B.L.) (Raja), Satischandra Giri, (Mohunt of Tarkeswar), Bunwari Anund Deb, (Maharaj-Kumar),

Sailendrakrishna Deb (Maharaj-Kumar), Kristodass Law, (Maharaj-Kumar), Resheecase Law, (Maharaj-Kumar), Dinendranarain Roy, (Kumar) (Landholder), Sarat Chandra Singh, (Kumar) of Paikpara, Nogendra Mullick (Kumar) (Landholder), Birendra Chandra Singh, (Kumar) of Paikpara, Kamalananda Singh, (Kumar) (Zemindar), Manmathanath Ray Chowdhury, (Kumar) (Zemindar of Sontosh), Kallynath Mitter (C.I.E.) (Late Member, Bengal Legislative Council), Sitabchand Nahar, (Rai Bahadur) (Zaminder, Azimgunge), Saratchundra Banerji, (M.A., B.L.), (Rai Bahadur), (Sibpur, Howrah), Rajcoomar Sen, (Rai Bahadur) (Sibpur, Howrah), Rajkumar Sarvadhikari, (B.L.) (Rai Bahadur), Callyprasanna Mazumdar, (Rai Bahadur) (Sibpur, Howrah), Rungati Mukherji, (Rai Bahadur) (Burdwan), Kalikumar Day (Rai Bahadur), Ramakshay Chatterji, (Rai Bahadur) (Burdwan), Radhnath Roy, (M.A.) (Rai Bahadur) (Cuttack), Radhaballuv Chowdhury, (Rai Bahadur, Zemindar, Sherpur), Amritlal Chatterjee, (Rai Bahadur) (Howrah, Kona), Krishnachandra Chatterji, (Rai Bahadur) (Cutwa, Burdwan), Manilal Nahar, (Rai Bahadur) (Zemindar, Azimgunge), Manilal Banerji (Rai Bahadur) (Zemindar, Kidderpur), Chunilal Bose, (M.B.) (Rai Bahadur) (Dr.), Krishnamohun Mookerjee, (B.L.) (Rai Bahadur) (Harinavi), Haricharan Chowdhuri, (Rai Bahadur) (Zemindar, Nakipur, Khulna), Chandranarain Singh, (Rai Bahadur), Jadunath Mazumder, (M.A., B.L.), (Rai Bahadur) (Jessore), Sitanath Roy, (B.L.) (Rai Bahadur) (Hon'ble) (Zemindar, Dacca), Banamali Roy, (Rai Bahadur) (Zemindar, Pabna), Debendranath Roy, (Rai Bahadur) (Dr.), Matilal Haldar, (B.L.) (Rai Bahadur), Kisorilal Goswami, (M.A., B.L.) (Rai Bahadur) (Zemindar, Seerampore), Lalitmohun Singh Roy, (Rai Bahadur) (Zemindar, Chuckdighi, Burdwan), Haranchandra Mukherji, (Rai Sahel) (Zeminder, Janai, Hughly), Mahendranath Chatterji, (Rai Sahel) (Landholder), Haranchandra Rakshit, (Rai Sahel) (Majilpore), Charuchandra Mitter, (Rai Sahel), Ganeschunder Chunder, (Zemindar, Late Member Bengal Legislative Council), Janakinath Roy, (Zemindar, Dacca), Kiranchandra Roy, (Zemindar, Narail), Charuchandra Mullick, (Zemindar), Nandalal Goswami, (Zemindar, Seerampur), Neelcomal Mukherji, (Zemindar), Nagendranath Pal Chowdhuri, (Zemindar, Ranaghat), Jogeniranath Bose, (Zemindar, Chandernagore), Srish-

chandra Sarvadhikari, (Zemindar, Choa), Mahendralal Bose, (Zemindar, Chinsurah), R. N. Mukherji, (Merchant), T. P. Ghose, (Zemindar), Gopalchandra Chuckerbutty, (Zemindar, Suri), Gourisankar Dey, (M.A.) (Fellow of the Calcutta University), Brajendrakumar Sil, (B.L.) Akhilchandra Roy, (Zemindar, Narail), Syamacharan Gangooly, (B.A.), (Late Principal, Utterpara College), I. C. Bose, (M.A.), (Zemindar, Howrah), Damudardas Burman, (landholder), Gokulanand Chowdhury, (Cutlack), Pramathanath Mullick, (landholder), Parbati Coomar Mitter, Suresh Chandra Mukherji, (Zemindar, Uttarpara), Jagadeendranath Tagore, (Zemindar), Manimohun Sen, (Zemindar, Berhampore), Chaturbhuj Sahai, (Zemindar), Ranendramohun Tagore, (Zemindar), Charukrishna Majumdar, (Zemindar, Islampore), Devendranath Mitter, (Burdwan), Jaladhi-chunder Mukherji, Saratindranath Tagore, (Zemindar), Satindra Deb Roy Mahasaya, (Zemindar, Bansheria), Dwarkanath Chuckerbutty, (M.A. B.L.), (Zemindar), Amulyadhane Addy, (landholder), Mahendranath Bhattacharyya, (B.L.) (Zemindar, Santragachi), Nripendraaran in Ghose, (Zemindar, Sankrail), Sureshchandra Roy, (Zemindar, Gar Bhawanipur), Dhanapat Singh Nowlakhyia, (Zemindar, Azimgunge), Benimadhab Banerji, (Zemindar, Ajodhya, Bankura), Pulinbehari Singh, (Zemindar), Bhupendranarain Dutta, (Zemindar, Majilpore), Satischandra Pal Chowdhuri, (Zemindar) Bejoy Singh Dudhuria, (Zemindar, Azimgunge), P. L. Roy, (Bar-at-law), Shamla Seal (Landholder), Annadaprasad Biswas (Landholder), Jogerdranath Biswas, (Landholder), Prodyot Coomar Tagore, (Maharaj-Kumar Sir) (*Honorary Secretary, British Indian Association*).

APPENDIX B.

MR. MORLEY'S BUDGET SPEECH.

In the House of Commons, on June 6th, on the order for going into Committee on the East India Revenue accounts.

Mr. Morley, who was cheered on rising, said:—I am afraid I shall have to ask the House for rather a large draft upon its indulgence. The Indian Secretary is like the aloe, which, I think, blooms once in a hundred years, for he only troubles the House with speeches of his own once in 12 months. There are several topics which the House will expect me to say some thing about, and there are two or three topics of supreme interest and importance for which I will plead for the patience and comprehensive consideration of the House. We are too apt to find that gentlemen here and outside fix upon an incident of which they read in the newspaper; they put it under a microscope and they indulge in reflections upon it and then regard that as taking an intelligent interest in the affairs of India. (Laughter and "Hear, hear.") If we could suppose that on some occasion within the last three or four weeks a wrong turn had been taken in judgment in Simla or in the Cabinet or in the India Office, or that to-day in this House some wrong turns might be taken, what disasters would follow, what titanic efforts to repair these disasters, what devouring wastes of national and Indian treasure lost, and what a wreckage would follow in the train! I submit that these are quite certain or possible consequences which misjudgment either here or in India or among his Majesty's Government, might bring with it. Sir, I believe I am not going too far when I say that this is almost, if not quite the first occasion upon which what is called the British democracy in its full strength has been brought directly face to face with the difficulties of Indian Government in all their intricacies, all their complexities, and above all, in all their subtleties and their enormous magnitude. Last year, when I had the honour of addressing the House on the Indian Budget, I observed, as others have done before me, that it is one of the most difficult experiments that have ever been tried, I think, in human history whether you

can carry on, what I think for myself you will have to carry on in India, personal government along with free speech and free right of public meeting. That which last year was partially a speculative question has this year become more or less actual, and that is a question which I shall by and by have to submit to the House. I want to set out the case as frankly as I possibly can. I want, if I may say so without presumption, to take the House into full confidence so far and let nobody quarrel with this provision as public interests allow. (Hear, hear.) I will ask the House to remember that we do not only hear one another : we are ourselves this afternoon overheard. Words that may be spoken here are overheard in the whole kingdom. They are overheard thousands and thousands of miles away by a great and complex community ; and they are overheard by others who are doing the service and work of the Crown in India, and by those who take part in the great work of commercial and non-official life in India. We are overheard by great Indian princes who are outside British India. We are overheard by the great dim masses of Indians whom, in spite of all, we persist in regarding as our friends, and we are overheard by those whom, I am afraid, we must reluctantly call our enemies. (Hear, hear.) This is the reason why everybody who speaks to-day, including myself, must use language which is well advised, of reserves, and, as I say again, of comprehensive consideration (Hear, hear.)

FINANCE.

The subject of discussion being the Indian Budget I must turn for a moment to finance. I assume that all the members of the House have entirely mastered the statement of details of the accounts and estimates for the three years 1905-6, 1906-7, and 1907-8. I assume that these are in the mind of every member of this House. Last year I told the House that I could not regard with patience the salt tax (hear, hear)—a tax upon a necessary of life. I am glad to be able to say, as the House already knows, that the salt tax, which was reduced by half a rupee in 1903, and by half a rupee in 1905, has now been reduced by another half a rupee in 1907-8. I greatly rejoice because, after all, the rise in the consumption of salt,

in consequence of this reduction of duty, proved that it weighed upon the people. (Hear, hear.) The cost of this reduction is £3,000,000. These reductions amount to 60 per cent of the tax as it stood before March, 1903. After allowing for the effects of the reduction on salt, and the diminution, to be computed, of the revenue from opium of £600,000, we anticipate a surplus of three-quarters of a million pounds. All surpluses are satisfactory. This surplus is due to two causes. The first is the agricultural prosperity, and the second is that we have decided, in consultation with the Government of India, to reduce the military expenditure for the year by £500,000. (Cheers.) I am glad that meets with approval. The end of all is that our financial position is sound and we have a splendid security to offer for all loans that are raised in this country on Indian purposes and on Indian securities. One other particular which it is hard to mention without a good deal of controversy, is the past cost of the training of the British troops in India. Payments by India to the War Office in respect of the training of British troops for service in India is half a million pound per annum. The method of calculating this charge has not, I think, been changed for 20 years, and for some time it has been admitted that it should be submitted to investigation. All I can say is that my right hon. friend here will find a dragon in his path towards the Indian gold mine (Laughter). Meantime the controversy between us being unsettled a committee has been appointed with my right hon. friend's consent which will begin work in the autumn to ascertain the proportion of these charges that should be borne respectively by this country and by India. Lord Justice Romer will, I am glad to say, be the chairman of that committee, Lord Welby will be a member of it, and we shall agree upon a third member. There will also be three representatives of the Indian Office and two representatives of the War office, and I hope the result of their deliberations will be that some scheme or schedule of the respective charges will be arrived at which will do justice to the British tax-payer and justice also to the Indian tax-payer. There is one very important subject which I wish to press upon the attention of the House—namely the extension of the railway system. There, again, I am well aware of the enormous interest taken by traders in this country and the

interest taken or not taken, but which ought to be taken, by people living in India, in the extension of the railway enterprise in India. Here again I have been fortunate enough to get a committee of experts to go to India for the purpose of examining carefully into the details of the railway administration and how far the complaints are well-founded and justified. So much for railways.

A Prosperity Budget.

The Budget is a prosperity Budget. We have, however, to admit that a black shadow falls across the prospect, for the plague figures are appalling. But do not let us get unreasonably excited even about these appalling figures. If we had reviewed the plague figures last September, we might have hoped that this horrible scourge was on the wane. From 92,000 deaths in the year 1900, the figures went up to 1,100,000 in 1904, and they exceeded 1,000,000 in 1905. In 1906 a gleam of hope arose and the mortality sank to something under 500,000. The combined efforts of the Government and of the people produced that reduction, but alas, since January, 1907, the plague has again flared up in districts that had been filled with its terror for a decade. For the first four months of this year the deaths were 642,000 and exceeded the record for the same period in any past year. You must remember that we have to cover a very vast area and I do not know if these figures would appal us if we took the area of the whole of Europe. It was in 1896 that the plague first appeared in India, and up to April 1907, the total figure of those human beings who have died is 5,250,000. But, dealing with a population of 300 millions this great mortality, although enormous, is not at all comparable with the black death and other scourges which spread over Europe in earlier times in proportion to the population. The plague mortality, which was higher this year than in 1904, only represents a death-rate of about three per 1,000 (Hear, hear). It is local and particularly centres in the Punjab, the United Provinces, and Bombay. No one, I do not care to what school of Indian thought he belongs, can deny that measures for the extermination and mitigation of this disease have occupied the most serious, constant, unflagging, zealous and energetic attention of the

Government of India. (Cheers.) But the difficulties we encounter are enormous. It is possible that men may arise that afternoon and say that we are not enforcing with sufficient zeal proper sanitary rules, but I am certain other hon. members will get up to show that the great difficulty in the way of sanitary rules being observed arises from the reluctance of the population to practise them (Hear, hear.) They are naturally suspicious, and when all these new rules are forced upon them they naturally resent them, and resist them. I will not detain the house with the details of all the proceedings we are taking. We have instituted long scientific enquiries with the aid of the Royal Society of India. Then we have very intelligent officers, who have done all they could to trace the roots of this disease, and to discover, if they could, any means to prevent it. It is a curious thing that, while there appears to be no immunity from this frightful scourge for the natives, there is an almost entire immunity for Europeans. It is difficult to understand this immunity.

Opium.

I have reason to believe that an enormous number of gentlemen in this House are greatly interested in opium. Judging by the amount of correspondence I receive on the subject of opium, the interest of all the Churches and of both political parties, and of all the groups, is very sincere and very deep. I was going to say that the resolutions with which they favour me often use the expression, "Righteousness before revenue." (Laughter and cheers.) But you must not satisfy your own righteousness at the expense of other people's revenue. (Laughter.)

Mr. Lupton (Lincolnshire Sanford), —We are quite ready to bear the expense. ("Order")

Mr. Morley. —My hon. friend says they are quite prepared to bear the expense; I commend that observation hopefully to the Chancellor of the exchequer —no, not hopefully. (Laughter.) This question touches the conscience of the people of this country very deeply. My hon. friend sometimes goes a little far; still, he represents a considerable body of feeling. (Hear, hear.) Last May, when the opium question was raised in this House, something fell

from me which reached the Chinese Government and the Chinese Government, on the strength of that utterance of mine, made in the name of his Majesty's Government, have persistently done their best to come to some sort of arrangement and understanding with his Majesty's Government upon the subject of opium. In September an Imperial decree was issued in China ordering the strict prohibition of the consumption and cultivation of opium, with a view to the ultimate eradication of all the evils of that evil habit in the space of ten years. A correspondence took place with my right hon. friend, the Foreign Secretary, and since then there has been a considerable correspondence, some of which the House is, by question and answer, acquainted with. The Chinese Government have been always assured not only by my words spoken in May, but by the Foreign Secretary that the sympathy of this country was with the objects set forth in their decree of the September. Then a very important incident, as I regard it, and one I think likely to prove very faithful, was the application by the United States Government to our Government as to whether there should be a joint inquiry into the opium traffic by the United States and the other Powers concerned. The House knows, by question and answer, that his Majesty's Government think that procedure by way of commission rather than by way of conference is the right way to approach the question. But no one can doubt for a moment, considering the enormous interest the United States have shown on previous occasions, that some good result will come from this.

Earl Percy (Kensington. S.) asked whether in this inquiry other Powers were to participate besides ourselves.

Mr. Morley.—Oh yes, certainly. I think it has already been stated to the House by the Foreign Secretary. The point was that the United States Government wished to be informed whether his Majesty's Government were willing to take part in a joint international commission of investigation, and whether certain other Powers were likewise willing. I think the noble lord will find that all the greater Powers have been consulted. I will not detain the House with the details, but certainly it is a great satisfaction to know that a great deal of talk as to the Chinese interest in the suppression of

opium being fictitious is unreal. I was much struck by a sentence written by the correspondent of "The Times" at Peking recently. Everybody who knows him is aware that he is not a sentimentalist, yet he used remarkable language. He said that he viewed the development in China of the anti-opium movement as encouraging ; that the movement was certainly popular, and was supported by the entire native Press, while a hopeful sign was that the use of opium was fast becoming unfashionable, and would become more so. A correspondence so far as the Government of India is concerned is in progress. Those of my hon. friends who think we are lacking, perhaps in energy and zeal, I would refer to the language used by Mr. Baker, a very able finance member of the Viceroy's Council, because these words really define the position of the Government of India :— "What the eventual outcome will be it is impossible to force. The practical difficulties which China has imposed on herself are enormous and may prove insuperable, but it is evident that the gradual reduction and eventual extinction of the revenue that India has derived from the trade has been brought a stage nearer and it is necessary for us to be prepared for whatever may happen." (Hear, hear.) He added that 20 years ago, or even less, the prospect of losing a revenue of $5\frac{1}{2}$ crores a year would have caused great anxiety, and even now the loss to Indian finances would be serious and might necessitate recourse to increased taxation ; but if, as they had a clear right to expect, the transition was effected with due regard to finance and was spread over a term of years, the consequence need not be regarded with apprehension.

The Amir.

When I approach military expenditure, and war and the dangers of war, I think I ought to say a word about the visit of the Ameer of Afghanistan, which excited so much attention, and kindled so lively an interest in great parts, not only of our own dominions, but in Asia. I am persuaded that we have reason to look back on that visit with the most entire and complete satisfaction. (Cheers.) His Majesty's Government, previously to the visit of the Amir, instructed the Governor-General in Council on no account to open any political questions with the Amir. That was really part of the conditions of

the Amir's visit ; and the result of that policy, which we, looking back on it, regard as we did before, has been to place our relations with the Amir—a very important person—on an eminently satisfactory footing, a far better footing than would have been arrived at by any formal premeditated convention. The Amir himself made a speech when he arrived at Kabul on his return, and I am aware that in that speech I come to a question of what may seem a party or personal character which it is not in the least my intention to deal with. This is what the Amir said on April 10—"The officers of the Government of India never said a word on political matters, they kept their promise. But as to myself, whenever and wherever I found an opportunity I spoke indirectly on several matters which concerned the interest of my country and nation. The other side never took undue advantage of it and never discussed with me on those points which I mentioned. His Excellency's (Lord Minto's) invitation to me was in such a proper form that I had no objection to accept it. The invitation which he sent was worded in quite a different form from that of the invitation which I received on the occasion of the Delhi Durbar. In the circumstances, I had determined to undergo all risks at the time of the Delhi Durbar, and, if necessary, to sacrifice all my possessions and my own life but not to accept such an invitation as was sent to me for coming to join the Delhi Durbar." These things are far too serious for me or anybody to indulge in controversy upon, but it is a satisfaction to be able to point out to the House that the policy we instructed the Governor-General of India in Council to follow has so far worked extremely well.

Military Expenditure.

I will go back to the Army. Last year when I referred to this subject I told the House that it would be my object to remove any defects that I and those who advise me might discover in the army-system, and more especially, of course in the schemes of Lord Kitchener. Since then with the assistance of two very important committees, well qualified by expert military knowledge, I came to the conclusion that an improved equipment was required. Hon. gentlemen may think that my opinion alone would not be worth much but after all

civilians have got to decide these questions (Hear, hear), and provided that they arm themselves with the full expert knowledge of military authorities, it is their voice which settled the matter.

Certain changes were necessary in the allocation of units in order to enable the troops to be better trained, and therefore our final conclusion was that the special military expenditure shown in the financial pages of the Blue-book must go on for some years more. But the House will see that we have arranged to cut down the rate of the annual grant and we have taken care and this I think ought to be set down to our credit—that every estimate for every item included in the programme shall be submitted to vigilant scrutiny here as well as in India (Hear, hear.) I have no proposition in favour of military expenditure, but the pressure of the facts, pressure of the situation, the possibilities of contingencies that may arise, seem to me to make it impossible for any Government or any Minister to acquiesce in the risks on the Indian frontier. We have to consider not only our position with respect to foreign Powers on the Indian frontier but also the turbulent border tribes. All these things made it impossible—I say nothing about internal conditions—for any Government or any Minister with a sense of responsibility to wipe out or in a high-handed or cavalier way to deal with this military programme. (Opposition cheers.)

POLITICAL & SOCIAL CONDITIONS.

Now I come to what I am sure is in the minds of most members of the House—the political and social condition of India. Lord Minto became Viceroy, I think, in November, 1905, and the present Government succeeded to power in the first week of December. Some of the criticism which I have seen on the attitude of Lord Minto and his Majesty's Government leaves out of account the fact that Lord Minto did not come quite into a haven of serenity and peace. (Hear, hear.) Very fierce monsoons had broken out on the Olympian heights at Simla, in the camps, and in the councils at Downing-street (laughter) and this was the inheritance into which Lord Minto came—rather a formidable inheritance for which I do not, this afternoon, for one moment attempt to distribute the responsibility.

Still, when Lord Minto and myself came into power, our policy was necessarily guided by the conditions under which the case had been left ; we were faced by unexampled conditions of controversy and confusion. In one famous case we happily succeeded. But in Eastern Bengal, for a time, we did not succeed. When I see it declared in newspaper-articles that the problem of India is altogether outside party questions, I well know it from experience to be the forerunner of a regular party attack. (Laughter, and "Hear, hear"). It is said there has been supineness on the part of Lord Minto and other persons—vacillation and hesitation. There have been no supineness, no vacillations, no hesitation, from December, 1905, up to the present day, (Cheers).

THE FULLER EPISODE.

I must say a single word about one episode and it is with sincere regret I refer to it. It is called the Fuller episode. I have had the pleasure of many conversations with Sir Bampfylde Fuller since his return and I recognise to the full his abilities, his good faith, and the dignity and self-control with which he, during all this period of controversy, has never for one moment attempted to defend himself, or to plunge into any sort of contest with the Viceroy or His Majesty's Government. I think conduct of that kind deserves our fullest recognition. (Hear, hear). I recognize to the full his gifts and his experience but I am sure that if he were in this House he would not quarrel with me in saying that those gifts were not well adapted to the situation which he had to face. Gentlemen opposite may be inclined to take a view hostile to Lord Minto, but I would just remind them that Lord Minto, happily for me, was appointed by their own Government.

Mr. Balfour—Why should we be hostile? (Hear, hear)

Mr. Morley.—I do not for a moment suggest that the right hon. gentleman is hostile, but I have seen expressions of hostility from his friends. I would not dream of criticizing the right hon. gentleman or any of his more serious friends. (Laughter). But that position has been taken up. What was the case? The Lieutenant-

Governor suggested a certain course. The Government of India thought it was a mistake, and told him so. The Lieutenant-Governor thereupon said, "Very well, then I am afraid I must resign." There was nothing in all that except what was perfectly honourable to Sir Bampfylde Fuller. But does anybody take up this position, that if a Lieutenant-Governor says, "If I cannot have my own way I will resign," then the supreme Government of India is bound to refuse to accept that resignation? All I can say is I do not care who the man may be, but if any gentleman in the Indian service says he will resign unless he can have his own way, then so far as I am concerned in the matter, his resignation will be promptly and definitely accepted. (Hear, hear). It is said now that Sir Bampfylde Fuller recommended certain measures about education, and that the Government have now adopted them. That is not so. I should like to say that the circumstances are completely changed. What was thought by Lord Minto and the Government of India to be a rash and inexpedient course in these days the circumstances have changed. I will only mention one point. There was a statement the other day in a very important newspaper that the condition of anti-British feeling in Eastern Bengal had gained in virulence since Sir Bampfylde Fuller's resignation. This, the Viceroy assures me, is an absolute perversion of the facts. The whole atmosphere has changed for the better. (Hear, hear.) When I say that Lord Minto was justified in the course he took, I say it without any prejudice to Sir Bampfylde Fuller, or any prejudice to his future prospects.

THE UNREST IN THE PUNJAB.

Now I come to the subject of the disorders. Disorder has broken out in the Punjab. I think I may assume that the House is aware of the general circumstances from answers to questions. Under the Regulation of 1818 violent, coercive measures were adopted. It would be quite wrong, in dealing with the unrest in the Punjab, not to mention the circumstances which provided the fuel for the agitation. There were ravages by the plague, and these ravages have been cruel. Again, the seasons have not been favourable; and a second cause was that an Act was on the anvil which was

believed to be injurious to the condition of a large body of men. Those conditions affecting the Colonization Act were greatly misrepresented. An Indian member of the Punjab Council pointed out how impolitic he thought it was; but, as I told the House about a week ago, the Viceroy declining to be frightened by the foolish charge of pandering to agitation, and so forth, refused an assent to that proposal. But in the meantime the proposal of the colonization law had become a weapon in the hands of the preachers of sedition. (Hear, hear). I suspect that the hon. member for East Nottingham (Sir H. Cotton) is of opinion that this mischief connected with the Colonization Act accounted for the disturbance. But I call his attention to this fact, and in order that the House may understand whether or not the colonization Act was the main cause of the disturbance. We submit that it was not. There were 28 meetings held by the leading agitators in the Punjab. Of these five only related, even ostensibly, to agricultural grievances; the remaining 23 were all purely political. Lala Lajpat Rai took part in two of these meetings, of which one related to the Colonization Bill, and the other agitator took part in 13, of which only two related to agricultural grievances. I hope those who take up the position that this was an agrarian movement and not a political movement in the Punjab will see that the facts are against any such contention. (Cheers.) The Lieutenant-Governor visited 27 out of 29 districts. The situation was serious, and it was growing worse. The speeches of Lala Lajpat Rai were very greatly dominated by sedition, by a good deal of intolerable rhodomontade (laughter); and they were published broadcast, even on the floor of this House. The speeches of this agitator, as well as the language used by Ajit Singh, were scattered all over India, and I think these malicious incitements to revolt were an instrument in disseminating the sedition. (Cheers.) The Lieutenant-Governor then declared that the situation was serious and ought not to go on. Sir Denzil Ibbetson described him as a revolutionary and a political enthusiast who had been carried away by his theories into the most intense hatred of the British Government, but his private character appeared to be without reproach. The Lieutenant-Governor was satisfied on information obtained practically from all over

the Punjab, from many diverse sources, of which I am satisfied myself, that Lala Lajpat Rai has been the organizer in chief of the agitation and of the systematic propagandism.

Methods of Sowing Sedition.

In this agitation special attention was paid to the Sikhs and to the military pensioners. Special efforts were made to secure the attendance of these Sikhs, who, as the House is aware, are the best soldiers in India. (Cheers.) At these meetings attempts were made to enlist their sympathies and to inflame their patriotism, and so far the active agitation has been gradually confined to districts in which the Sikh element is predominant. At one of the public meetings at which disaffection was openly preached, men of the Sikh regiments were specially invited, and several hundreds of them did attend. What is it that was said to the Sikhs? They were told that they would be asked to shoot down their fellow-countrymen, and then a particularly vile line of argument was taken. It was asked, "How is it that the plague attacks the Indians and not the Europeans?" "The Government," said these men, "have mysterious means of spreading the plague; the Government spreads the plague by poisoning the streams and wells, in some villages the inhabitants have actually ceased to use the wells. I was informed only the other day by an officer, who is in the Punjab at this moment, that when visiting the settlements he found the villagers disturbed in mind on this point. He said to his men: 'Open up the pits, and see whether these horrible things are in them.' The men did as they were ordered, but the suspicion was so great that they insisted upon the glass of the telescope, with whose aid the pits were examined, being unscrewed in order to be quite sure that there was no pill behind the glass. (Laughter and cheers.) But it may be asked, 'Why do you not prosecute these men?' I think Sir Denzil Ibbetson gave a good reason, and for my part I entirely approve of it. They have found by experience that a prosecution advertises far and wide the subject against which objection is taken, that it brings the matter to the ears of thousands who would never have heard of it otherwise, and that it attracts public attention to the prosecution of men

who pose as martyrs for the good of their country. The speeches of counsel are, after all, even more harmful than the original libel. (Laughter and cheers.) Then when the sentences are pronounced there are pathetic scenes in Court; there are accounts published of how they are attended on the road, and how they are conducted in procession through the streets.

No Apology for Deportation.

Accidents in India may lead to dire results. It would have been absurd for us, knowing we had got a weapon there at our hands by laws—not an exceptional law, but a standing law—and in the face of the risk of a conflagration, not to use that weapon; and I for one have no apology whatever to offer for doing it. (Cheers.) Nobody appreciates more than I do the danger, the mischief, the iniquity of what is called “reason of State.” I know all about that. It is full of mischief and full of danger; but so is sedition, and I should have incurred criminal responsibility if I had opposed the resort to this law against sedition. I will deal with that directly. I do not wish to detain the House with the story of events in Eastern Bengal and Assam. They are of a different character from those in the Punjab, and in consequence of these disturbances the Government of India, with our approval, have issued an Ordinance, which I am sure the House is familiar with, under the authority and the terms of an Act of Parliament. The course of events in Eastern Bengal appears to have been mainly this—First attempts to impose the boycott on Mahomedans by force, secondly, complaints by Hindus that the local officials stop them, and by Mahomedans that they do not try to stop them, thirdly, retaliation by Mahomedans, fourthly, complaints by Hindus that the local officials do not protect them from this retaliation; fifthly, general lawlessness of the lower classes on both sides, encouraged by the spectacle of fighting among the higher classes; sixthly, more complaints against the officials as the result of that disorder in certain districts having been complained of. The result of the Ordinance has been that down to May 29, it had not been necessary to take action in any one of these districts. I noticed the ironical cheer on the part of the right hon. gentleman

when I referred with perfect freedom to my assent to the resort the weapon we had in the law against sedition, and I have had communications from friends of mine that in this assent I am outraging the principles of my life. (Cheers.) I should be ashamed if I detained the House more than two minutes on anything so small as my life. That can very well take care of itself. I began by saying that this is the first time that British democracy in its full strength, as represented in this House, is face to face with the enormous difficulties of Indian government. Some of my hon. friends, perhaps my right hon. friend, look even more in sorrow than in anger upon this alleged backsliding of mine. Last year I told the House that India for a long time to come, so far as my imagination would reach, would be the theatre of absolute and personal government, and that raised some doubts. Reference has been made to my having resisted the Irish Crimes Act as if there were a scandalous inconsistency between opposing the policy of that Act and imposing this policy on the natives of India and supporting the deportation of these two men. That inconsistency can only be established by anybody who will take up the position that Ireland, a part of the United Kingdom, is exactly on the same footing as these 300,000,000 people—composite, heterogencous, with different histories, different races, different faiths. (Cheers.) Does any body contend that any political principle is capable of application in any sort of circumstances without reference to conditions? I, at all events, have never taken that view, and I would like to assure my hon. friends that in such ideas as I have about political principles, the leader of my generation was Mr. Mill. Mr. Mill was a great and benignant lamp of wisdom and humanity, and I and others kindled our modest rush lights at that lamp. What did Mill say about the Government of India? Remember, he was not only that object being a philosopher, (laughter,) but practised, in Government, responsible, experienced, concerned in the Government of India. What did he say? If there is any body who can be quoted as having been a champion of representative government it is Mill, and in his *Look* which, I take it, is still the classic book on that subject, this is what he says:—"Government by the dominant country is as legitimate as any other if it is the one which in the existing state of civilization of the sub-

ject people most facilitates their transition to our state of civilization." (Cheers.) Then he says this: "The ruling country ought to be able to do for its subjects all that could be done by a succession of absolute monarchs guaranteed by irresistible force against the precariousness of tenure attendant on barbarous despotism and qualified by their genius to anticipate all that experience has taught to the more advanced nations. If we do not attempt to realize this ideal we are guilty of a dereliction of the highest moral trust that can devolve upon a nation."

Views of Indian Officials.

I will ask the attention of the House for a moment while I examine a group of communication from officers of the Indian Government, and if the House will allow me, I will tell them what to my mind is the result of all the communications as to the general feeling in India; for that, after all, is what concerns us about this unrest in the Punjab and Bengal sooner or later—and sooner, rather later, I hope—to pass away. What is the situation of India in view of these experienced officers at this moment? I ask the House to bear with me when I say that even as passing through all our stress and anxiety it is a mistake not to look at the thing rather largely. They all admit that there is a fall in the influence of European officers over the population. They all, or nearly all admit that there is estrangement—I ought to say, perhaps, refrigeration—between officers and people. There is less sympathy between the Government and the people. For the last few years—this is a very important point—the doctrine of administrative efficiency has been pressed too hard. The wheels of the huge machine have been driven too fast (Hear, hear). ~~One~~ administration—so shrewd observers and very experienced observers assure me—would be a great deal more popular if it was a trifle less efficient, a trifle more elastic, generally. We ought not to put mechanical efficiency at the head of our ideas. But I am leading up to a particular point. The district officers representing British rule to the majority of the people of India are overloaded with work in their official relations. These

relations we know are more likely to be disagreeable than agreeable, and I know there are highly experienced gentlemen who say that a little looseness is better fitted than the regular system of latter days to win and to keep personal influence, and that we are in danger of creating a pure bureaucracy. (Hear, hear.) Honourable, faithful and industrious the servants of the State in India are and will be, but if the present system is persisted in they are likely to become rather mechanical, rather lifeless, perhaps I might even say rather soulless ; and attention to this is urgently demanded.

Centralization.

Perfectly efficient administration, I need not tell the House, has a tendency to lead to over-centralization ; it is inevitable. The tendency in India is to override local authority and to force administration to run in official grooves. For my own part, I spare no pains to improve our relations with native Governments, and more and more these relations may become of potential value to the Government of India. I would use my best endeavours to make these States independent in matters of administration, but all evidence tends to show we are rather making administration less personal, though evidence also tends to show that the Indian people are peculiarly responsive to sympathy and personal influence. (Hear, hear.) Do not let us waste ourselves in controversy, here or elsewhere, or in mere anger : let us try to draw to our side those men who now influence the people. I believe for my part that most of the people of India are on our side. I do not say for a moment that they like us ; but no matter ; they know that their whole interest is bound up with the law and order we preserve. But I will come to my point. There is a motion on the paper for an enquiry by means of a Parliamentary Committee or Royal Commission into the causes at the root of the dissatisfaction. Now I have often thought while at the India Office whether it would be a good thing to have an inquiry by committee or commission. I have considered this and I have discussed this with others ; and I have come to the conclusion that such inquiry would not produce any of the advantages such as were gained in the old days of old committees

and certainly would be attended by many drawbacks. But I have determined after consulting with the Viceroy that considerable advantage might be gained by a Royal Commission to examine, with the experience we have gained over many years, into this great mischief—for everybody knows, all the people in India who have any responsibility, that it is a great mischief of over-centralization (Hear, hear.) It seemed a great mischief to so acute a man as Sir Henry Maine, who, after many years' experience, before he departed, wrote expressing agreement with what Mr. John Bright said just before or just after the Mutiny, that the centralized government of India was too much power for any man to work. Now, when two men, quite unlike in temperament and training, agreed as to the evil of centralization on this issue scale, it makes one reflect. I will not undertake at the present time to refer to a large Commission such as was referred to by Sir H. Maine and Mr. Bright, but I do think that much might be gained by an inquiry on the spot into the working of centralization of government in India, and how, in the opinions of trained men here and in India, this mischief might be alleviated (Hear, hear). But that is not a question before us now: You often hear people talk of the educated section of the people of India as a mere handful and infinitesimal fraction; and so they are in numbers; but it is idle to say, fatally idle to say, that this infinitesimal fraction does not count. This educated section makes all the difference, is making and will make all the difference. That they would attack the British system of Government has been long known, it was inevitable. There need be no surprise in the fact that they want a share in political influence, they want a share in the emoluments of administration. Their means, those of many of them are scanty; they have little to lose and much to gain from revolutionary changes. They see that the British hand works the State machine surely and smoothly, and they think, having no fear of race animosities, that their hands could work the machine as surely and as smoothly as the British hand. From my observations I should say they could not do it for a week (Hear, hear). It would break upon. But now I come to my last point. Last autumn the Governor-General appointed a committee of the Executive Council to consider the development of the administrative machinery;

and at the end of March last he publicly informed the Executive Council that he had sent home a despatch to the Secretary of State proposing suggestions for a move in advance. This was not in accordance with instructions from us ; it emanated entirely from the Government of India. Now let us consider this. The Viceroy with a liberal—I do not use the word in a party sense—with a liberal, courageous mind entered deliberately on the path of improvement. The public in India were aware of it. They waited, and are now waiting the result with the liveliest interest and curiosity. Meanwhile the riots happened in Rawalpindi, in Lahore. After these riots broke out, what was the course we ought to take ?

Some in this country lean to the opinion—and it is excusable—that the riots ought to suspend all suggestions and talk of reform. Sir, his Majesty's Government considered this view, and in the end they took very determinedly the opposite view. (Cheers.) They held that such a withdrawal from a line of policy suggested by the Governor General would, of course, have been construed as a triumph for the party of sedition and of the enemies of the Viceroy. They held that to draw back on account of local and sporadic disturbances, however serious, anxious, and troublesome they might be, would have been very grave humiliation. To hesitate to make beginning with our own policy of improving the administrative machinery of the Indian Government would have been taken as a sign of nervousness, trepidation and fear ; and fear, which is always unworthy in any Government, is in the Indian Government, not only unworthy, but dangerous. I hope the House concurs with his Majesty's Government (Cheers.) In answer to a question the other day I warned one or two of my hon. friends that in resisting the employment of powers to suppress disturbances under the Act of 1818 or by any other lawful weapon we could find, they were promoting the success of that disorder, which would be entirely fatal to all their projects with which they sympathised. (Cheers.) The despatch reached us in due course. It was considered by the Council of India and by his Majesty's Government, and our reply was sent about a fortnight ago. Some one will ask—are you going to lay these two despatches on the table to-day ? I hope the House will not take it amiss if I say that at this stage—perhaps in all stages it would be wholly disadvantageous to lay these

despatches on the table. We are in the middle of the discussion to-day, and it would break up the continuity if we had a premature discussion "coram populo." Every one will understand that discussions of this kind must be very delicate, and it is of the utmost importance that these discussions should be conducted with entire freedom (Hear, hear). But, to use a word that I do not often use, I might adumbrate the proposals.

Proposed Reforms.

This is how the case stands. The despatch reached his Majesty's Government, who considered it ; and we then set out our views upon the points raised in the despatch. The Government of India made an attempt to frame what is called a resolution. That draft resolution, when framed by them in conformity with the instructions of his Majesty's Government, will in due course be sent here. We shall consider that draft, and then it will be my duty to present proposals to this House if legislation is necessary, as it probably will be ; and they will then be returned to India to be discussed there by all those concerned. The proposals I would adumbrate are these. We have given approval to the establishment of an Advisory Council of Notables. Those who are acquainted with Indian affairs will recollect that Lord Lytton in 1877 set up a Council of this kind. It was a complete failure.

Earl Percy.—Was it actually brought into existence ?

Mr. Morley.—I think so, but it never did any good. Then Lord Curzon had the idea of a Council, but I think the scope was limited to business connected with the Imperial Service Troops. The Council of Notables would have a much wider scope. It would be purely advisory, but would serve the double purpose of eliciting independent opinion and of diffusing, what is most important of all, correct information as to the facts and intentions of his Majesty's Government. It is remarkable how the Government, on the one hand, knows so little of the mind of the people (Cheers), and it is deplorable, on the other hand, that the people know so very little about the mind of the Government. It is a tremendous chasm that

we have to bridge, and whether political machinery can ever bridge it I know not. The second proposal is the acceptance of the general principle of a substantial enlargement of the Legislative Councils (Hear, hear), both the Governor-General's Legislative Council and the Provincial Legislative Councils. Details of this reform have to be further discussed in consultation with the local Governments in India, but an official majority must be maintained. Thirdly, in the discussion of the Budget in the Viceroy's Council the subjects are to be grouped and explained severally by the members of the Council in charge, and longer time is to be allowed for the detailed discussion and for general debate. One more thing, the Secretary of State has the privilege of nominating members of the Council of India. I think that the time has now come when the Secretary of State may safely, wisely, and justly nominate one, and it may be two, Indian members. (Cheers). I will not discuss the question now, I may have to come to Parliament at a later stage, but I think it is right to say that that is my intention, realising how few opportunities the governing bodies have of hearing the voice of Indians. (Hear, hear).

The Principles of Government.

I think I have defended myself from ignoring the principle that there is a difference between the Western European and the Indian Asiatic. That is a vital difference and it is infatuation to ignore it. But there is another vital fact—namely that the Indian Asiatic is a man with very vivid susceptibilities of all kinds, and with great traditions of a civilization of his own; and we are bound to treat him with the same kind of respect and kindness and sympathy that we should expect to be treated with ourselves. (Cheers). Only the other day I saw a letter from General Gordon to a friend of mine. He wrote—"To Government there is but one way, and it is eternal truth. Get into their skins, try to realize their feelings. That is the true secret of Government." (Cheers) That is not only a great ethical, but a great political law, and I hope that in all we do it will not be forgotten. It would be folly to pretend to any dogmatic assurance—and I certainly do not—as to the course of the future

in India. But for to-day anybody who takes part in the rule of India, whether as a Minister or as a member of the House of Commons participating in the discussion on affairs in India—any one who wants to take a fruitful part in such discussion, if he does his duty will found himself on the assumption that the British rule will continue, ought to continue, and must continue. (Cheers). There is, I know, a school—do not think it has any representatives in this House—who say that he might wisely walk out of India and leave it, and that the Indians would manage their own affairs better than we can manage them for them. I think anybody who pictures to himself the anarchy, the bloody chaos that would follow from any such deplorable step would shrink from any such decision. (Hear, hear.) We, at all events—the Ministry and the members of this House—are bound to take a completely different view. (Hear, hear.) I believe that certainly the Government, and I believe certainly this House, all its partisan groups, is determined that we fight to face, that we do face, all these mischiefs and difficulties and dangers of which I have been speaking with a clear conscience. We know that we are not doing it for our own interest, but for the interest of the million committed to us ; and we ought to face them with sympathy, with kindness, with firmness, with a love of justice, and whether the weather be fair or foul, in a valiant and hopeful spirit. (Cheers.)

MR. MORLEY'S REFORMS.

I.

Decentralisation Commission.

THE terms of reference* to the proposed Decentralisation Commission open, in our opinion, a vista of immense possibilities. When Mr. Morley expressed his intention of appointing such a Commission, the proposal only moved a smile. People thought that it was one of those Commissions which occasionally emanate from Government—Commissions which make a noise for some time and then lapse into eternal silence. We have witnessed the appointment of many such Commissions, and looked, therefore, upon the proposal for appointment of a new one with apathy. Our apathy was shared by even English politicians, who have frequent opportunities of mixing with the leading members of the India Council in England. The aim and scope of Mr. Morley's proposal were little understood. Now when we read the terms of reference with

London, August, 22.

"In the House of Commons, replying to Sir Charles Dilke, Mr. Morley announced the terms of reference to the Decentralisation Commission. They are as follows :—To enquire into the relations, financial and administrative, between the Supreme and Provincial Governments and between the latter and the authorities subordinate to them ; and to report whether by decentralisation or otherwise those relations can be simplified and improved, and whether the system of Government can be better adapted to meet the requirements and promote the welfare of the different Provinces and, without impairing its strength or unity, to bring the executive power into closer touch with local conditions."

the words in which the Commission was referred to, we think we see how Mr. Morley's mind was working, and we are glad to perceive that the scheme was conceived in a far different spirit from what the speaker was credited with. If the Commissioners do their duty, their labours, we are sure, will be productive of most fruitful results. All the most important administrative problems have been brought to a focus, and authoritative suggestions for their solution have been invited. We have been asking for the appointment of a Commission of Enquiry, and in an indirect way our request has been complied with. We feel justified in thinking that at last an earnest endeavour is about to be made for grappling with the difficulties of the Indian administration.

Let us see now what the terms of reference disclose. The Commissioners are entrusted with five branches of enquiry, and are requested to prepare and submit schemes for the removal of the defects and for the substantial improvement, of the administrative machinery. Nay more; we shall not feel surprised if the Commission be instructed to make suggestions for framing a Constitution for the Indian Government, adapted to the most important requirements of the people.

The groups of subjects about which enquiries are to be conducted and suggestions made for improvement are as follows :—

(1) To enquire into the relations, financial and administrative, between the Supreme and the Provincial Governments :

(2) To enquire into the relations between the Provincial Governments and the authorities subordinate to them :

(3) To report whether by ~~dece~~centralisation or otherwise the relations above referred to can be simplified and improved:

(4) To report whether the present system of Government

can be better adapted to meet the requirements and promote the welfare of the different Provinces :

(5) To report whether without impairing its strength and unity, the existing system of Government can be better adapted to bring the executive power into closer touch with local conditions.

We have grouped the subjects of enquiry and report in the way in which we have understood the terms of reference. Whether there be any hidden meaning not clear to the naked eye we are unable to judge.

The first three groups are of very great importance. The question of independence and inter-dependence, of domination and subordination, between the Supreme and the Local Governments and their subordinate officials will be discussed, and, if found necessary, a scheme is to be formed to alter the present frame of Government in such a manner that all the different parts may act independently without undue interference from, but under the salutary domination of, the Supreme Government. The evils of what is called over-centralisation are to be avoided without impairing the strength and unity of the dominant power.

The fourth group is of the utmost concern to us. On the right consideration of this group of subjects depends the well-being of the people. How far the present bureaucratic institutions are to be relaxed, how far and in what proportion natives of intelligence, virtue and energy are to be employed in the different Departments of State, and how far they may be invested with powers to govern, will have to be determined. Here the question will arise whether, if concession be made of admitting a large number of Indians into the Executive Service, the Civil Service regulations may be so modified as to make them adapted to Indian requirements and Indian conditions. It will be remembered that not long ago the

House of Commons voted that the Civil Service Examinations might be held simultaneously in England and India. But the India Council was against such a concession being made, the vote of the House of Commons was denounced as a *catch-vote*, whatever that may imply, and no effect was given to it.

The second question to be examined is how the Judicial Service is to be reconstituted. We have the authority of Sir William Markby to state that, in the opinion of Sir Henry Maine and Sir James Stephen, the great majority of District Judges are "shamefully inefficient," and that "the appeals in most cases lie from better to a worse-instructed tribunal." These are grave defects, and should promptly be removed. In the Education Service the scandal is witnessed of Indian professors of European reputation, who have been original discoverers of scientific truths, occupying a position far inferior to that of the European professors, imported from England, but possessing only ordinary scientific attainments.

We will not speak here of the proposed reform of the Legislative Councils, as the reorganisation of these Councils has already been undertaken.

We have not touched upon the last group of subjects. In examining this group we are reminded of the following words of Mr. Morley:—"All evidence," he says, "tends to show that we are rather making administration less personal, though evidence also tends to show that the Indian people are peculiarly responsive to sympathy and personal influence." The disadvantages of a personal form of Government are as great as its advantages. It is useless to discuss this question here at present. We would only bring to the notice of our readers what Sir Henry Maine said on the subject: "While I admit," he says, "that the abridgment of discretion by written laws is to some extent an evil.....I do not admit the proposition, which is sometimes advanced, that the Natives of

India dislike the abridgment of official discretion.....the repugnance which they invariably profess for discretionary Government has always seemed to me to be genuinely hearty and sincere."

We have been told that our reading of the terms of reference is not correct; that we have taken a romantic view of the situation; that our imagination has coloured our views; and that the credit we give to Mr. Morely and to Lord Minto, by whom the path of improvement was first pointed out, is not due to them. We attach no importance to this scepticism. We remember what Lord Minto said in the Council Chamber; we have seen what Mr. Morley thinks of the despatch which was sent to the Home Government; we vividly recollect the words of the Secretary of State in his Budget speech; and we do not hesitate to say that the proposed reforms will not be sterile, on the contrary, if liberally carried out, they will be productive of great benefit. The following words of Mr. Morley should always be remembered, even when we are obliged to severely criticise his bureaucratic measures: "*Do not let us waste ourselves in controversy, here or elsewhere, or in mere anger; let us draw to our side those men who now influence the people.*" We will add only one qualifying expression. The men who influence the people, at a crisis like the present, should be drawn to the side of Government, if these men have the confidence of our natural leaders—leaders who possess a material stake in the country—and if the influence exercised is calculated to promote the welfare of the country.

When the Commissioners enter upon their task they are sure to be harassed with assertions that India is not fit to govern herself, that the educated community is insignificant, and that the destiny of the vast mass of the population should not be placed in the hands of a "microscopic minority." Systematic effort has been made by a certain school

of Anglo-Indian politicians to minimise the value of the growing influence of our cultured people. Lord Dufferin, who at one time encouraged the growth of the popular movement, did, in a moment of irritation, stigmatise this influence as that of a "microscopic minority." The cry was immediately taken up by hostile critics, and it has since been increasing in volume and strength. We are glad to see that Mr Morley has been rebutting, in his usual felicitous way, this malicious charge. "You often hear," he said in his Budget speech, "people talk of the educated section of the people of India as a mere handful and infinitesimal fraction; and so they are in numbers; but it is idle to say, fatally idle to say, that this infinitesimal fraction does not count. This educated section makes all the difference, is making and will make all the difference." The unfortunate pronouncement of one of the leading British statesmen referred to above, has been fruitful of mischief. It has served to alienate, in a great measure, the ruled from the rulers. We have tried in vain to point out the falsity of the dictum. Like colour to the colour-blind it has produced no effect. In vain we said that even a single man, not to speak of a handful of men, has influenced the destinies of nations. Buddha was only an anchorite when he waged an intellectual war against the Brahmanical hierarchy. Millions obeyed his call, and at the present day, we are told, his followers outnumber the followers of all other religions put together. A handful of ignorant fishermen in the land of Galilee, at their Lord's behest, have revolutionised the world of modern thought. Napoleon was but a poor student, but he brought virtually under his domination the oldest, the richest and the most powerful kingdoms of Europe. Sivaji was but a petty jagirdar, but he shattered the great Mogul sovereignty and founded the Marhatta empire. These are well-known historical facts, but the lesson they taught was totally ignored. It is a matter for congratulation now that the light of truth has at last dawned upon the minds of British

statesmen. The numbers of educated men may be small compared with the great mass of uneducated men in India ; but the former feel that they have the giant's strength, and will be able to move the heavens at one time or another. In Bengal, the proportion of the educated to the uneducated is ten to one. It is fatally idle to say, to use Mr. Morley's words, that one educated man cannot influence ten ignorant men with whom he is in daily touch.

Since the above was written, the list of members composing the Commission has been published. We are gratified to find that Sir Henry Primrose has been appointed Chairman of the Commission. The appointment has given universal satisfaction. His name is a guarantee that the work of the Commission will be most efficiently done. His mature experience and intimate knowledge of the people of India will enable him to deal effectually with even the most complicated questions that may be submitted for his consideration. We are also glad to find that Mr. R. C. Dutt, C. I. E., has been appointed a member. He is the only Indian member. The selection of Mr. Dutt is unexceptionable, but it is not possible for a single Indian member, however able and experienced, to represent the whole country. We would suggest that in each Province two or three of our leading representative men may be invited, whether as ordinary or extraordinary members, to co-operate with the Commission.

29-8.

(II.)

Advisory Councils.

OUR readers are aware that the proposed Advisory Councils will be of two descriptions :—Imperial and Provincial. The first is the Advisory Council of the Viceroy, and the latter of the Provincial Governors. The former will

be composed of leading ruling Chiefs and of territorial Magnates—large landholders of sufficient status and dignity and commanding extensive influence. The Councils will be constituted only for consultative purposes, they will exercise no legislative functions, and will have no original powers of initiation. They will be consulted individually or collectively, or by means of selected Committees, on important affairs of State. Their opinions will be entitled to the highest consideration, but will not be authoritative and binding upon the Viceroy. The Viceroy, however, may make any use of them that he may deem necessary for the benefit of the State. The proceedings of the Councils are to be informal and strictly private and confidential. The term of office is to be for five years, but the Councillors may be re-appointed after the termination of their term of office. The Provincial Councils are to be constituted on a wider basis. To the Provincial Magnates are to be added the representatives of the smaller landholders, of capital, of industry, of commerce and of the professional classes. The number of the Imperial Councillors is to be sixty, but the Provincial Councils are to be of smaller size. Imperial interests to be considered all over the country are necessarily far more extensive than Provincial interests, and hence the proposed limitation. We heartily welcome the creation of these Councils. They have our cordial support. The Councillors, if properly selected, will be strong pillars of the State. They are the real leaders of the people. They are, as a rule, men of wealth, position and influence, and will be able to wield this influence for promoting the welfare of the country. Hitherto they generally kept themselves aloof from political struggles. We are glad to see that the Government of India have wisely determined to take them into their confidence, and have decided to avail themselves of their aid and counsels. These counsels will be cordially given, and will be calculated to lighten in a great measure the enormous difficulties which surround the administration. They will be

trusted agents for explaining the intentions and the motives of action of the Government to the people with whom they are in daily touch and intercourse, and will also be able to represent to the ruling Power the ideas and sentiments of the people and their pressing requirements. The creation of these Councils shows the earnest desire of our rulers to intimately associate with ~~them~~ our leading men, in the task of governing this vast empire, so that most effectual measures may be taken for securing the well-being of the people. The Councillors will be trusted advisers of our sovereign in the Indian Empire. The organisation has been happily conceived and will be enthusiastically welcomed by real friends of the country.

We are grieved to see that the proposal has raised a discordant voice in the Indian Press. We would ask our contemporaries to view the reform in the light of ^{an advance} ~~referred to~~. The most formidable stronghold of the bureaucracy now is the Executive Council of the Viceroy. We may expect an access to ~~this Council~~ ^{it} in no long time. An inroad has already been made into the India Council, and as a concession of principle we welcome the appointment of two of our countrymen to it. If the Liberal Government be in power, if Mr. Morley continue to be at the head of affairs, and if Lord Minto's Government be guided, as now, by mature judgment, our hopes for further reforms may soon be realised.

We miss in the constitution of the Councils an adequate representation of ~~the educated classes of~~ ^{our cultured} men, in whom the most cherished hopes of our country are centred. In the Imperial Council no trace is to be found of any of them, and in the Provincial Councils a most scanty recognition of their claims is most grudgingly made. Government seems to have ignored their growing influence. Most stringent provisions appear to have been made, most strict injunctions given, to exclude this strong and most powerful element from

participation in the administration. This influence under the control of a beneficent Government would yield most salutary results, but if an illiberal attempt is made to repress it, it may be productive of incalculable mischief. There is an old but significant adage in Upper India which says that the fire may be smouldering for a time, but if you attempt to keep it down by wrapping it round with a cotton quilt, your effort will be fruitless; it will blaze forth in redoubled fury. Sound statesmanship should enlist this influence on the side of Government.

The establishment and recognition of a determinate body of advisers, as the Government of India say, would be in accordance with the best traditions of oriental polity. "These have always recognised that a Sovereign, however absolute, should make it his business to consult competent advisers, and should exercise his rule in accordance with what after such consultation be deemed to be the best mind of the people." The scheme would thus be, as the Government point out, no innovation in principle, but, if judiciously applied, would be of immense advantage.

Let us see what Manu, the great ancient Law-giver of India, says on the subject :

"Let the king worship Brahmans who are well-versed in three-fold sacred sciences and learned in polity and follow their advice" (VII. 37.) "From them he should always learn good conduct, though disciplined; for a well-behaved king never perishes." (39) "From those versed in the three Vedas let him learn the three-fold sacred sciences, the primeval science of Government, the science of dialectics, and the knowledge of the Supreme Soul; from the people the theory of the various trades and professions." (43) "The king should appoint seven or eight well-versed noblemen as ministers, who are men of property and culture, brave and courageous, and have the capacity of grasping thoroughly the subjects that may be presented to them for consideration." (54) "Let him perpetually consult with those

ministers on the 'protection of his people' (56) "Having first ascertained the opinion of each minister separately, and then the views of all together, let him do what is most beneficial for him in public affairs." (57) "Retiring to a lonely place let him consult with them unobserved." (147). "That king whose secret plans other people do not discover will enjoy the whole earth." (148) "Let him deliberate with them on the result of his acts and measures." (153)

The learned Brahmins of Manu's time are the educated men of the present day.

The quotation given above will show that the Council of Ministers ordained by Manu has a striking resemblance to that organised by Lord Minto's Government. The latter appear to have taken Manu's Council as their model. It would seem as if the text of the great Indian Law-giver was before them when they framed the constitution of the proposed Councils. Manu mentions six qualifications as essential in a minister for filling the office of a competent adviser. We will freely render Manu's injunctions into modern political language. The minister selected should be loyal and faithful and should be firmly attached to the Crown; he should be descended from a family of distinguished merit; he should have a material and hereditary stake in the country; he should be well-educated and cultured; he should be a man of striking personality and, hating subserviency and cringing hypocrisy, should have the courage of freely expressing his opinions in utter disregard of freaks and frowns; he should have the capacity for thoroughly grasping the questions that may be presented to him for consideration. These are qualifications in an adviser of the Crown as good now as they were at the time when Manu promulgated his laws. The Government has acted wisely in following his example in organising these Councils. Let ~~it~~^{they} now, keeping in view the principle enjoined by Manu, make a judicious selection. If the selection be carefully made, the appointment of the Councilors will be sure to be hailed with universal satisfaction.

The proceedings of these Councils will be, as we have said before, private and confidential. There are occasions when it is absolutely necessary that the advice given should be held as confidential; but there are other occasions when the opinions expressed by Councillors, if published, will be of material value in allaying popular excitement and in removing popular prejudices and misconceptions. The proposed public conferences may in some measure satisfy public curiosity, but if they be held only on rare occasions, they cannot be expected to meet the popular demand.

We do not like the names which have been proposed to be given to these Councils. They are cacophonic and are not agreeable to us. The name, "Council of Elders", would have been more acceptable. "What's in a name?" says the immortal bard of England; but in ordinary life an attractive name makes even a repulsive undertaking agreeable, and by an attractive name a really useful project becomes consecrated in the imagination of the people.

It has been suggested that the Councillors should have an appropriate prænomen and cognomen. The cognomen, we see, is to be I. C., as P. C. is the cognomen of the Privy Councillors in England. But what about the prænomen? "Right Honourable" is perhaps too high-sounding and may be deemed inapplicable to Indian Councillors. The title "The Most Honourable" has been mentioned in this connection, but we do not know whether the English aristocracy would tolerate such a title being granted to the Indian nobility. We commend the matter to the consideration of experts in English heraldry.

III.

The Imperial Legislative Council. (1)

THE provisions proposed to be made for reconstituting the Legislative Councils, both Imperial and Provincial, have not given general satisfaction. The dictum that official majority must be maintained has vitiated the usefulness of the new scheme. Let us examine the scheme for the Imperial Council before we offer any comment upon it. The following synopsis regarding the number of seats proposed to be given to official and non-official members of the Council will give a succinct view.

A.	Ex-Officio	7.
	The Lieutenant Governor	...		1		
	The Commander-in-Chief	...		1		
	Members of the Executive Council	...		5		
B.	Additional Officials to be nominated		20
C.	A Ruling Chief to be nominated		1
D.	Elected Members :					
	(a) By the Chambers of Commerce of Calcutta and Bombay ;				(Probably 2)²	
	(b) By the Provincial Councils,—Madras, Bombay, Bengal, E. B. and Assam, United Provinces, Pun- jab and Burma ;		7
	(c) By Nobles and great Land-owners,— Madras, Bombay, Bengal, E. B. and Assam, United Provinces, Punjab and Central Provinces ;			...		7
	(d) By Mahomedans		2
E.	Nominated Members representing Minor-					

ities or Special Interest (not less than two being Mahomedans)	4
F. Experts nominated for special purposes		(probably 3)?	
		Total 53.	
		With the Viceroy—54.	

It will be observed from the synopsis given above that the Council is to consist of 53 members, and if the Viceroy be included, the number would be 54. From the telegram before us we are unable to determine the number of seats that is intended to be allotted to the Calcutta and Bombay Chambers of Commerce, and to experts to be nominated for special purposes. We are inclined to think that probably 2 will be given to the former and 3 to the latter.*

We notice that under the proposed arrangement the additional non-official members to be nominated are to be 8, and to be elected 18, while under the present system they are only 10—5 nominated and 5 elected. The addition of 16 to both nominated and elected members is undoubtedly a liberal concession, but this has been neutralised by an addition of 14, and probably of 18, to official members. In an emergency, the Government, we believe, can safely reckon upon the Mahomedan, the minority and the expert votes. This will give an overwhelming majority to Government, and the non-official independent members will be exactly where they were. The addition of so many members will lengthen the proceedings of the Council in the way of academic discussion without affording any appreciable public benefit. Two small words—"official majority"—have entirely marred the effect of the proposed reform.

* Since the above was written we find that the number of seats to be allotted to the Ex-Officio members is to be 8, to the Calcutta and Bombay Chambers of Commerce 2, and to Experts to be nominated for special purposes 2.

We are reminded in this connection of the significant Greek fable of Tantalus. He was a wealthy and powerful king, who was severely ~~punished~~ ^{shocked} by Zeus for betraying confidence. He was punished in the lower world by being afflicted with a raging thirst and at the same time placed in the midst of a lake, the waters of which always receded from him as soon as he attempted to drink them. Over his head, moreover, hung branches of fruits, which receded in like manner when he stretched out his hand to reach them. The moral is not far to seek. We expected great results from the announcement of the proposed expansion of the Councils, but when the terms of the proposed reform became known, we were sorely disappointed. Our dis-appointment has become keener from the fact of our hopes being raised and subsequently blighted by the stern decree of a perverse fate. Well, we must submit to the inevitable.

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It has been said that two kings cannot wield one sceptre. Granting for the sake of argument that it is not possible for two kings to exercise joint authority, it cannot be gainsaid that two powerful groups of councillors, even though equally divided, only serve to strengthen the hands of the king, he being the sole judge in all disputed questions submitted for his consideration.

It is absurd to say that the supreme authority of the Paramount Power, in the Imperial Council, would ever be disputed. If the votes of the official and non-official members were made equal in number, the casting vote of the Viceroy, if it should happen that the official members are in conflict with the non-official members, would always decide the issue in favour of Government. The unity, strength and the paramount authority of the Government could never be, and would never be, disputed. We can conceive of no emergency, no adverse circumstances, under which non-official members

could be swayed by unworthy and suicidal motives. The mere idea of conflict of opinion, when public welfare is concerned, is repulsive to us. If such a contingency should ever occur, the remedy is in the hands of the Viceroy. He is armed with the power of deciding the course, which, in his opinion, would be most beneficial to the people. The prevailing idea of the Government being defeated by the popular vote is most mischievous in its origin and must be most strongly deprecated. Such an idea betrays want of confidence in the councillors, and is not calculated to promote harmonious co-operation. Then again, for special purposes, and for emergent occasions, the Viceroy is empowered to exercise his discretion in nominating members on whose cordial support he would be entitled to reckon with safety. Why then is such reluctance shown in strengthening the power of the non-official members? Such strength, if granted, could, under all conceivable circumstances, only redound to the credit of the Government.

11-9.

 IV.

The Imperial Legislative Council. (2)

WE do not approve of a seat being given to a ruling Chief. When, in 1861, the Council was reconstituted on a reformed basis, a distinguished ruling Chief and a renowned minister of another powerful Chief were nominated. It was thought that they would be able to render material help in the work of legislation. The experiment signally failed, and the practice has since been virtually discontinued. The ruling Chiefs live isolated from British India, are ignorant of the requirements of its residents, and have no influence among them. The appointment, therefore, of a ruling Chief may serve no useful purpose.

It has been asserted that in a comprehensive scheme for

representation the Mahomedans should be assigned their legitimate places, and in that view four seats are proposed to be given to them. We are on principle opposed to creed representation. It is most mischievous in its results. Once this rule is admitted there would be no end of embarrassment and troubles. Representatives of all the different creeds in the country would clamour to have a share in legislation, and if their claims are not recognised, there would be deep discontent. The sound principle is to appoint representative Indian gentlemen of influence, of proved merit and ability, and not representatives of any creed. A noted Buddhist, influential Mahomedans, competent Christians and Parsis were selected, not because they belonged to different creeds, but because they were distinguished men of our community, and to their nomination not the slightest objection was ever raised. The sharp distinction which is attempted to be drawn between Hindus and Mahomedans cannot be too strongly condemned. If four seats be granted to Mahomedans, not less than three times that number should be allotted to Hindus as Hindus, in proportion to their numerical strength and influence, and irrespective of their claims as landowners or Provincial Councillors. And what about Christians, Parsis, Sikhs, Jains and representatives of other religions? A feeble and slight recognition under the heads of "minorities" and "special interests" will not satisfy them. The question requires serious reflection, and ought not to be decided on mere sentimental grounds. The theory of "Divide and Rule" has long been exploded, and no liberal system of Government should ever attempt to revive it. The sole object of the Government should be to make an earnest attempt to leaven all the prevailing creeds of the country with humanising influence, to unify them for political purposes, and make them work harmoniously together. An endeavour, conscious or unconscious, to create political opposition among them, will only end in disaster.

We are glad that a pointed acknowledgment has been made of the importance and just claims of the propertied classes. Their admission to representation, in however small a measure, must be highly commended. It is also a matter for congratulation that the Government of India are impressed with the necessity for giving substantial representation to the great landholders, "who not only constitute the aristocratic and stable elements of the Indian society, but also represent the interests of the landholders, great and small." Any measure adopted to strengthen this class would only serve to benefit Government in various directions. Their cordial support in an emergency and their valuable aid in the work of administration and legislation can always be reckoned upon. We are sorry to see, however, that only *seven* seats are proposed to be given to them. Considering the large body of landholders and the complex variety of landed interests, even twice the number of seats now allotted to them would hardly meet the requirements of the country. Viewed, however, in the light of a beginning, we welcome the proposed arrangement.

We cannot accept the suggestion that "in every case it would be made a condition that the member elected to represent this class must himself belong to it." This is a most illiberal provision, and should not find a place in any sound scheme for representation. We can mention notable instances in which most valuable legislative services were rendered by representatives of this class who owned no landed property. The question to be considered in this case is whether the men selected are qualified to adequately represent the views and interests of the landed classes and possess their entire confidence. If they do not possess these qualifications they will never be chosen as representatives. The suspicion about what is called "wire-pulling" is entirely groundless. Our landholders, as a class, are wideawake men. They thoroughly understand their own interests and can thoroughly distinguish

the difference between competent and incompetent representatives. If they do not choose a representative from their own body, there must be substantial reasons for it. These reasons point, in most cases, to want of education, proper training and requisite experience. We are of opinion, therefore, that "the condition" sought to be imposed is improper and unnecessary, and should be withdrawn.

We are grieved to find that the claims of the educated section of the community have been entirely ignored. It cannot be too often repeated that men of property and men of culture, in all countries, and specially in India, form a compact body. They very often act together, assist each other, and co-operate with each other in all important and useful undertakings. Any attempt to separate them will prove abortive. If they be allowed to work harmoniously together, most salutary results would be obtained, but if they be opposed to each other, the consequences would be fatal. Every endeavour should be made to strengthen their union and co-operation in the interests of good government, and we would earnestly commend this matter to the careful consideration of the Government. The object of legislation is, as we have often said, to secure the well-being of the people, and this well-being cannot be secured and safe-guarded unless legislation is adapted to their requirements. These requirements can only be properly represented by our propertied men or their representatives and our cultured men of proved merit, ability and experience.

In this connection we would draw the attention of the Government to the following extract from the Despatch of Sir Charles Wood to the Government of India, dated 9th August, 1861 :—

"The Imperial Legislature has by this Act (Indian Councils Act) provided for the first time for the admission of Europeans independent of the Government and of natives of India to take part in the

important work of legislating for India. I have no doubt this measure will be hailed with satisfaction throughout the country. I entertain as little doubt that your Lordship will be able to fill up these appointments with persons in every way qualified to give the Government important and valuable assistance in matter that may come before it, and I anticipate that the introduction of intelligent Native gentlemen into the Council will bring to its deliberations a knowledge of the wishes and feelings of the native population, which cannot fail to improve the laws passed by the Council by adapting them to the wants of the great mass of the population of India."

It will be observed that the object aimed at in admitting Indian gentlemen to the Legislature was that they might adequately represent to it "the wishes and feelings of the people." Even after the lapse of half a century the standpoint then taken remains unaltered at the present day. Only the character of the representatives has slightly changed. It is our landholders and cultured men who are qualified to speak with authority on behalf of the people.

We earnestly recommend the admission to electoral privileges of the five great Universities of the Province, and granting to them at least *four*, if not *five* seats. If the proposed number 53 must be maintained, let these *four* or *five* seats be obtained by reducing those allotted to official members, "minority" and "Special interest" members.

We have no hesitation in saying that unless the reformed Council be founded on a *broad* basis, the growing discontent of the country will be aggravated, and the efforts of the Government to meet the urgent requirements of the people will prove fruitless. The importance and the ever increasing influence of the educated classes has been freely acknowledged and it behoves the Government now not to ignore, but to give free scope to, the legitimate aspirations of our countrymen.

V.

Provincial Councils.

There is no definite scheme for the organisation of the Provincial Councils ; but the lines upon which they are to be constructed have been plainly indicated. The privilege of election given to the Universities, Trades, Associations, Presidency Corporations, and other recognised public bodies, will probably be left untouched. The European planting and industrial interests and Indian Commerce will, we believe, receive due consideration. But the privilege of election hitherto largely enjoyed by the local Municipalities and District Boards will be considerably modified. New elements are to be introduced into them, apparently with the object of extending the sphere of representation, but really with the object of reducing the number of seats that are assigned to what are called "the professional classes." Most scathing remarks are made against representatives selected from these classes and the Provincial Governments are enjoined to confine these men within the lowest possible limits.

The general principle which these Governments are desired to bear in mind is that "the widest representation should be given to classes, races and interests subject to the condition that an official majority must be maintained." That there may be no mistake in applying the principle to concrete cases, it has been suggested that "For the election of representatives of each class the Local Governments shall publish a list of voters, consisting of members of that class (to which seats are assigned) who have held or are holding office in the Municipal or Local Boards, supplemented by others whom the Governments may nominate after consultation with the *Anjnmans*, *Panchayets*, or other bodies which have been constituted by the class in question for the direction of its own affairs," In other words, representation is to be based on racial, reli-

gious and caste or class distinctions, and local Boards forming electorates are to be crowded with voters recruited from heterogeneous groups of men. This is not all. As the constitutions of the Provincial Councils must largely depend upon the Municipal and local Boards, the organisation of the latter bodies must be radically changed, so that landlords, traders, capitalists, professional men, cultivators and even artisans, may jostle with each other for seats on the different classes of local Boards in the Province. In recommending such an organisation, it has apparently been forgotten that landlords, as a class, would refuse to sit on the same Boards with *Mudies* or small-traders, *Baniyas* or capitalists and with their own *rayats* or cultivators and artisans. The organisation as proposed will do its level best to keep landlords and all other respectable men at a distance from it, and thus the object of giving the widest possible representation to all classes of society will be virtually defeated. Our Boards would be a conglomeration of heterogeneous groups of men disconnected from all respectable men of the Indian Society.

If we are permitted to enquire into the motive of creating such a non-descript assemblage called an electorate, it is not possible to get a satisfactory answer. If the object be to exclude competent school-masters, lawyers and "professional men," it will be signally defeated in spite of the safe-guards recommended. The classes of society mentioned—namely, the cultivators, small traders, artisans and *baniyas*—are exceedingly amenable to the predominating influences of the cultured men of the community, and under the proposed arrangement our educated men, who have been officially ostracised, will have an easy time of it in getting themselves chosen, if they have a mind to enter the arena. If the object be to discredit the proposed system of representation, more effective steps could not be conceived to make it a butt of ridicule.

We have repeatedly pointed out the defects of racial, religious, caste and class representation. We would deprecate it in the strongest language. Indian society has long been distracted by class distinctions to which prominence is now sought to be given in constituting new political organisations. Our social progress has been retarded by these disturbing elements, and the Government, in reviving them, would only be instrumental in creating social and political struggles that would end in confusion and chaos. The glamour with which the self-government propaganda has hitherto been invested, will be dissipated, throwing the country a century back on the path of advancement. The unity, strength and solidarity of the propertied classes and the most intelligent and educated classes of our society, would be destroyed, and the country would again be subjected to most enervating influences. The social forces which make for progress would decline for want of materials to work upon, and without an invigorating stimulus for action, no strenuous efforts would be made for vitalising the beneficial but perishing institutions of the land. We have high authority for saying that the efficiency of a good form of Government is tested by the effect it has on men and things, and we would earnestly commend this dictum to the careful and sympathetic consideration of those who sway our destinies.

We feel at times bewildered by the directions given. In one place we are told that "for the present at any rate the needs and sentiments of the masses of the people must find expression through those, whether officials or non-officials, who are acquainted with their daily life, and are qualified to speak with authority on their behalf." In another place strict injunctions are given to grant the widest representation to races, creeds, castes, classes and interests; and "occupational groups"—including even cultivators, artisans, small shopkeepers and others of this description—are specially men-

tioned as entitled to seats on the elective Board. Now the Census Reports show that 78 to 80 per cent of the population are agriculturists or cultivators, who form the masses of the people, and whose "needs and sentiments," we are assured, could be effectually expressed by competent officials and non-officials. Artisans, small traders and *Baniyas* are included in the same category. How then are we to reconcile the dicta laid down about the negligible factors included in the masses of the people and the so-called representatives of races, creeds, castes and "occupational groups"? The majority of these men are steeped in ignorance; they may, as Lord Curzon says, be keenly alive to the consideration of questions relating to indigence and affluence, but are in blissful ignorance of their rights and privileges as members of the body politic. An attempt to bring them in even as electors would only lead to confusing results in the proposed system of representation.

A broad hint is given that if, in spite of strict injunctions, the Municipalities and District Boards prove recalcitrant, and the influence of the "professional classes" is not kept within prescribed limits, "a counterpoise to the excessive influence of these classes may be supplied by creating an additional electorate recruited from the landed and the monied classes." This unmistakably shows the attitude of the Government towards our educated countrymen—an attitude which we deeply deplore. Here we feel bound to point out an egregious mistake which has been made in confounding all our cultured men with members of the professional classes. There are thousands of our educated men who are neither professional men, nor professional agitators. They are cultured men of independent means and moderate views, who keep themselves aloof from the outrageous propaganda of a certain section of the present-day political agitators. These men merit a treatment far different from what is proposed to be meted out to them. They, at any rate, should be exempted

from the sweeping condemnation of the *bete noire* of the predominant school of Anglo-Indian politicians.

We refrain from offering any suggestions for framing a scheme for reconstituting the Bengal Council. But we would draw the attention of the Bengal Government to the scheme for representation which was submitted to Sir John Woodburn's Government by the Committee of the British Indian Association in 1898. The salient features of the scheme are as follows :—

1. Elective franchise is to be given to the propertied classes and the educated classes in proportion corresponding to their relative importance.

2. The Province is to be divided into a certain number of electoral circles, each circle comprising a certain number of districts.

3. The district is to be taken as the lowest unit of representation.

4. The propertied men in each district are to be divided into three classes each paying, directly or indirectly, one-third of the aggregate taxation including land revenue and cesses. The educated section of the community of a certain standing is to form the fourth class. Each class to select one elector to represent it. This would give four electors to each district representing the four classes.

5. The qualification for a vote in the first three classes is to be payment of Rs. 1,000 per annum, in land revenue or taxes of any kind.

Age limit in all the classes is to be 24 years.

6. Each class of electors in a given circle representing the different districts to select one representative. The four representatives of the four classes to form the Central Electoral Council.

This Council is to elect a member of the Legislative Council.

7. The qualification for a fourth class candidate for election to the Legislative Council is to be payment of Rs. 1,000 per annum in

taxes of any kind. This might be relaxed in favour of candidates of exceptional merit.

This is a mere skeleton, but it can be easily filled up by a reference to the letter of the British Indian Association to the Bengal Government, dated 5th July, 1898. Electoral privilege has been given to Municipalities and District Boards since this letter was written, and Bengal has been divided into two Provinces. But as regards the main political and administrative condition of united Bengal, the situation remains unchanged.

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VI.

Budget Discussions.

A distinguished Financial Member of the Viceroy's Council once said, "Our Budget-day is only a show-day. The real work is done in my study, or in my office-room." What he meant to say was that the Government of India exhibit on this day, in a well-lighted chamber on the upper floor of the Government House, their choicest financial articles in stock, describe some of their striking qualities, and allow a few chosen guests to make their short comments. These remarks are received courteously, and brief replies are given to them. Then the lights are extinguished, the curtain drops, and no more is heard of the exhibition; the actors fly to different points of the compass to enjoy their holiday, and the Upper Ten, pay a long visit to Elysian fields to gain fresh administrative vigour by enjoying balmy breeze on cool Himalayan heights. To be serious, the debates in Council, on the Budget-day, are frankly admitted to be "unreal." They do not in any way practically touch the financial policy and the administrative decisions of the Government. They profess to be an annual review of the administration

and of the financial arrangements, but they are really academic discussions, which have not the slightest effect on the foregone conclusions of the Government. The suggestions made by the councillors for improvement are unheeded, and no effectual notice is ever taken of the lugubrious speeches delivered in the Council Chamber. Serious complaints have been made of the existing system, and influential representations have been submitted to the Government to give ampler opportunity to non-official members to make popular requirements known to the authorities, and to press for their suggestions for improvement being accepted by the ruling power.

We are happy to see that popular comment and criticism have at last been brought to the serious notice of the Government of India, and that reforms are proposed which might to some extent touch the evil complained of. The Government of India propose that the "Budget should be discussed in the first instance by separate heads or groups of heads, which would be explained severally by the Member in administrative charge, this discussion being followed by a general debate in which members would enjoy the same freedom, as at present, of criticising the administration." We are told that "Remarks made in the course of the ampler and more practical discussion, which is now contemplated, would be borne in mind by the Government of India, or the Local Government, when making financial arrangements in subsequent years;" and a hesitating and uncertain pronouncement is made that, "*it might perhaps, on occasions, be found possible to alter the Budget actually under review.*" The faint hope of altering the Budget, held out in such faltering language, will not, we are bold to think, have the least chance of being realised. Be that as it may, we fail to see in what effectual manner the proposed change of procedure would touch the core of the existing evil. More detailed explana-

tions would be given by Members in charge of the Administration, and ampler opportunities granted to non-official members to make their views known—and that will be the sum total of the proposed reform. The object in view might more easily, and more efficaciously, be attained by writing exhaustive reports, and forwarding them to non-official members and requesting their matured views upon them. Why then is this wasteful sacrifice of the valuable time of the Legislature? What practical good will it do? The discussions might, we are told, bear fruit in subsequent years. "Subsequent years" is a vague and indefinite expression. Legislators, like administrators, have proverbially short memories, and a period of even twelve months, under present conditions, is sufficiently long to obliterate all traces of academic discussions and manuscript eloquence. There may be thousand vicissitudes to sweep away all past pronouncements. We have painful experience of even solemn official pledges. The less said about it, the better. All that we wish to say is that the proposed reform will only be a phantom. It may beguile us for a time by its delusive appearance; but it is only a shadow, and a shadow it will remain to the end of the chapter. It will serve no useful purpose.

Now that the question of modifying the regulations under which the Budget should be discussed is being considered, we should like to ask whether it is in contemplation to satisfy the popular demand that a portion at least of the public revenues should be under the control of the representatives of the people. The public revenues are mainly formed of taxes, and the taxes come from the life-blood of the nation. It is natural, therefore, that the people should wish that the decision about the question as to how these taxes should be raised, when necessary, and how they should be disposed of, when raised, should rest with their representatives in the Council. That the financial arrangements should, in a subs-

tantial measure, be under the supervision of these representatives, must, in an avowedly liberal form of Government, be admitted by leaders of political thought. Bureaucratic statesmen have hitherto succeeded in preventing our representatives from all interference with the financial programme; but the signs of the times lead us to believe that the concession asked for cannot be long delayed, when justice demands it. There are branches of administration in which, of course, the voice of the Executive Government must remain supreme, but there are other branches in which financial arrangements must be made in accordance with the wishes and requirements of the country. It is a leading principle of taxation that unpopular and obnoxious taxes should be avoided, and ^{that} the taxes raised should be most beneficially administered. It cannot be denied that the financial administration of the Government is capable of great improvement, and that the time has arrived for making a salutary change, and this change cannot be most efficaciously made without admitting the representatives of the people into the counsels of the Government. If in disputed cases unanimous decision of these representatives be found impracticable, the voice of the majority must be accepted. When ^a particular form of taxation, for instance, is under consideration, it may not be improbable that, owing to complex diversity of popular opinion; the non-official members would be in conflict; if such a contingency should occur, the best course to follow would be that the opinion of at least two-thirds of these members should prevail. The point we desire to press is that in the decision of all questions,—except those in which exceptional Government interests are concerned affecting the revenues of the country,—the non-official members should have a leading voice.

In this connection we wish to represent to Lord Minto's Government the desirability of holding two or three informal conferences of non-official members before making definite

financial arrangements for the year. The views of the Government and of the popular representatives would be discussed more freely than at a formal meeting of the Legislative Council, and much light might be thrown on important financial and administrative questions under consideration. The Bengal Government held such an informal conference, during the present year, and the deliberations of this conference, we believe, proved satisfactory.

The proposals for reform are "provisional and tentative." The Provincial Governments and important public bodies and distinguished individuals will be consulted before effect is given to them. We highly commend this decision, and we earnestly hope that the scheme for Reform will be modified and matured in the light of the comments and criticisms that may be freely made by the Press, the Local Governments, and other critics.

We have come to the conclusion of our remarks on the proposed Reforms. We expect great practical results from the labours of the Decentralisation Commission. We firmly believe that the work of the Commissioners, if properly conducted, would lead to radical improvement of the Indian Administration. The Advisory Council, if discriminately constituted, would prove a sheet-anchor of the vessel of State. The scheme has our cordial approval, and, when well-developed, the organisation will be productive of most beneficial political consequences. We attach the highest importance to the reform of the Legislative Councils. "Law," we read in the Veda, "is the king of kings, far more powerful and rigid than they ; nothing can be mightier than law, by whose aid, as by that of the highest monarch, even the weak may prevail over the strong." Laws to be useful must be adapted to popular requirements, and these requirements can be brought to the knowledge of the Legislature only by able and experienced representatives of the people. Budgets to be

effective must be guided by the enlightened voice of popular leaders in Councils, and no reforms would be welcomed which did not satisfy the aspirations of the people. Lord Minto's Government will be entitled to the eternal gratitude of our countrymen, if the proposed reforms are carried out in the spirit in which they have been conceived. We have freely criticised them, in the hope that the bureaucratic leaven which is now visible in them may be removed. Full credit is certainly due to His Lordship for "adequate appreciation of the realities of the present situation," but we wish that tangible expression might be given to this appreciation by practical work. We cannot do better than describe the present situation by His Excellency's own words pronounced in March last in the Council Chamber :—

"I recognise with him (Mr. Gokhale) that politically India is in a transition state, that new and just aspirations are springing up amongst its people which the ruling power must be prepared not only to meet but to assist. A change is rapidly passing over the land, and we cannot afford to dally. And to my mind nothing would be more unfortunate for India than that the Government of India should fail to recognise the signs of the time. I can assure all those who are interested in this great question that the Despatch we have recently addressed to Mr. Morely is fraught with great possibilities, and I earnestly trust that the suggestions it contains may go far towards satisfying the pressing requirements of the Indian Empire."

We do not want anything more than what His Excellency has so clearly indicated. We earnestly pray that the reforms may be so framed that they may be able to meet the pressing requirements of the Indian Empire. We would, in conclusion, draw the attention of the trusted advisers of His Lordship's Government to the following words of Mr. Morley in his Budget Speech, that they may be guided in their counsels by the spirit which animates the words of the Secretary of State :—

"The Indian Asiatic is a man with very vivid susceptibilities of

all kinds and with great traditions of a civilisation of his own : and we are bound to treat him with the same kind of respect and kindness and sympathy that we should expect to be treated with ourselves. Only the other day I saw a letter from General Gordon to a friend of mine. He wrote :—‘ To Government there is but one way, and it is eternal truth. Get into their skins, try to realise their feelings. That is the true secret of Government.’ That is not only a great ethical, but a great political, law, and I hope that in all we do, it will not be forgotten.”

We long for the kindness and sympathy of our rulers. We wish that they should realise our feelings and adopt such measures for the government of the Empire as would satisfy our requirements. If this be done, discontent will disappear, law and order will not be disturbed, and people will live happy and contented in the full enjoyment of the manifold blessings of the British rule.



APPENDIX C.

Mr. Morley's reforms.

TEXT OF THE PROPOSALS.

SIMLA, AUGUST 26.

The following telegram, dated London, 23rd August 1907, is from the Secretary of State for India to His Excellency the Viceroy :—

I have approved in Council the draft letter which you propose to address to the Local Governments regarding the formation of an Imperial Advisory Council, the formation of Provincial Advisory Councils, the enlargement of Imperial and Provincial Legislative Councils, and the procedure to be adopted in discussing the Imperial and Provincial Budgets. His Majesty's Government trust that the success of these important measures may be assured by the hearty co-operation of the classes for whose benefit they are designed.

The following telegram is from Sir Harold Stuart, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, to the Local Governments and Administrations, dated Simla, the 24th August 1907 :—

Sir,—In a speech addressed to the Legislative Council on the 27th March last, His Excellency the Viceroy announced that, with the object of satisfying the constitutional requirements of the Indian Empire, the Government of India had of their own initiative taken into consideration the question of giving the people of India wider opportunities of expressing their views on administrative matters. The Secretary of State for India has since intimated, in his speech in the House of Commons on the Indian Budget, that his Majesty's Government have examined the proposals submitted to them by the Government of India, and have authorised the Governor-General in Council to consult Local Governments, and invite public opinion on this important subject.

2. It is now twenty years since Lord Dufferin's Government initiated the discussions which resulted in the passing of the

Councils Act of 1892, the reforms then introduced comprising the enlargement of the Legislative Councils.

The recognition of the elective principle, the admission of interpellations, and the free discussion of the Budget, were held to be justified by the spread of English education, by the increased employment of natives of India in the actual administration of the country, and by the indubitable proof which they had given of their intellectual fitness for such employment. The extent of the advance that has since taken place in the development of the educated classes can hardly be judged by statistical tests, but it may be mentioned that, within the last twenty years, the number of scholars studying English has risen from 298,000 to 505,000 whilst the number of students passing the annual matriculation examination of the Indian Universities has increased from 4286 in 1886 to 8,211 in 1905, and the number of Bachelors of Arts from 708 in the former year to 1,570 in the latter. During this period higher education has penetrated to circles which, a generation ago, had hardly been affected by its influence. The ruling chiefs and the land-holding and commercial classes, possessing a material stake in the country, and representing the most powerful and stable elements of Indian society, have now become qualified to take a more prominent part in public life, and to render a larger measure of assistance to the executive Government. They no longer stand aloof from the new social and political conditions which affect the course of Indian affairs. They have profited greatly by the educational advantages offered to them under British rule, and they are anxious to be afforded an opportunity of expressing their views on matters of practical administration. No scheme of constitutional reform would meet the real requirements of the present time which did not make adequate provision for representing the landed aristocracy of India, the mercantile and industrial classes, and the great body of moderate men, who under existing conditions have no sufficient inducement to enter political life, and find but little scope for the exercise of their legitimate influence. For the present, at any rate, the needs and sentiments of the masses of the people must find expression through those, whether officials or non-officials, who are acquainted with their daily life, and are qualified to speak

with authority on their behalf. Nor does the scheme now put forward contemplate any surrender or weakening of paramount British power in India, upon which depend the safety and welfare of the vast population there committed to it. Subject to this essential condition, that the executive authority of the Government is maintained in undiminished strength, the Government of India believe that the proposals outlined below represent a considerable advance in the direction of bringing all classes of the people into closer relations with the Government and its officers, and of increasing their opportunities of making known their feeling and wishes in respect of administrative and legislative questions. The classes which will be enabled under the present scheme to take a more effective part in shaping the action of Government may reasonably look forward, as the necessary outcome of the measures now in contemplation, to a larger share in the actual work of administration, and more extensive employment in the higher offices of the State. The Government of India recognise the essential justice of the claim that is put forward, and they are convinced that it is possible without neglecting the other interests and obligations involved to move gradually forward towards the fulfilment, in no grudging spirit, of a pledge which the peoples of India are entitled to regard as inviolable.

3. The Governor-General in Council has been much struck by the difficulty encountered by the Governments in India in making their measures and motives generally understood, and in correcting erroneous and often mischievous statements of fact or purpose imputed to them. When the right of interpellation was granted by the India Councils Act of 1892 to the Legislative Councils, it was hoped that by that means correct information on public affairs might be more widely diffused. The Legislative Councils, however, are called together only when there is legislation to be undertaken. Their meetings are too infrequent to offer the means of confidential and intimate consultation between the Government and its subjects, and the strict procedure by which they are restrained naturally tends to formality. A means for this free and close consultation might be supplied by Advisory Councils of the type explained below, and, in the opinion of the Government of India, their organization should be undertaken with this as a principal object in view.

AN IMPERIAL ADVISORY COUNCIL.

(4). All Indian Governments and all administrative officers in their respective positions have made it their business to elicit the opinions on administrative measures and proposals for action of those qualified to advise them in all rank of society, and this process will of course continue. Such advice and opinion as are thus obtained are the indispensable foundation upon which good administration is built up, and the regular consultation of persons qualified to give them is part of the necessary procedure of government. It has, however, long been felt that considerable advantages might be expected from any measures which, without impeding the free action of the Executive Government of India, in the general conduct of affairs, would in some degree associate the great Ruling Chiefs and the territorial magnates of British India with the Governor-General, in the guardianship of common and imperial interests. The realisation of this idea has now been rendered more practicable by the closer conformity of the general principles, methods of administration in the more advanced Native States, to those followed in British territory, and by the fact that common interests have arisen and that certain measures, such as famine relief or education, may from time to time affect their own subjects and dominions calling for co-operation between the States and the British Government. A measure of the kind contemplated would thus, to some extent, satisfy a growing want in India. It would give a greater sense of responsibility to those whose advice is sought on questions submitted to them, and it would at the same time commend itself to public opinion as tending to promote more intimate relations between the component parts of the Indian Empire. The establishment and recognition of a determinate body of advisers who, while requiring no legislative recognition and possessing in themselves no formal powers of initiative, would be consulted individually by the Governor-General, and would occasionally be called together either in whole or in part for the purpose of collective deliberation, and would be entitled, when so summoned, to offer their counsel on matters affecting the welfare of the people, would, in the opinion of the Government of India, be a marked step in constitutional progress. It would maintain unimpaired the authority and res-

possibility of the Executive Government, and it would be in accordance with the best traditions of oriental polity. These have always recognised that a Sovereign, however absolute, should make it his business to consult competent advisers, and should exercise his rule in accordance with what, after such consultation, he deemed to be the best mind of his people. The scheme would thus be no innovation in principle (as are some applications of Western methods to Eastern Society), and, if judiciously applied, would, by evoking the stable forces fundamentally so strong in India, lend valuable aid to the orderly working of government. For this purpose what appears to be needed is an Imperial Advisory Council of sufficient size and weight to represent the views of hereditary leaders of the people, both in British India and in the principal Native States, to be consulted by the Governor General, either individually or collectively, or by means of committees appointed from among their number, on questions of sufficient moment to call for their advice, and to be used by him not only to draw out opinion on measures in contemplation, but also, what is hardly less important, as an agency for the diffusion of correct information upon the acts, intentions and objects of the Government.

5. It seems to the Government of India that the purposes which they have in view might possibly be attained somewhat on the lines of the following proposals :

- (1) That a Council, to be called the "Imperial Advisory Council" should be formed for purely consultative purposes.
- (2) That all the members should be appointed by the Viceroy and should receive the title of "Imperial Counsellors."
- (3) That the Council should consist of about sixty members for the whole of India, including about twenty Ruling Chiefs, and a suitable number of the territorial magnates of every province where landholders of sufficient dignity and status are to be found.

That the members should hold office for a substantial term, say, for five years, and should be eligible for re-appointment.

- (5) That the Council should receive no legislative recognition and should not be vested with formal powers of any sort.
- (6) That its function should be purely advisory, and that it should deal only with such matters as might be specially referred to it from time to time.
- (7) That the proceedings of the Councils when called together for collective consultation should, as a rule, be private, informal and confidential, and they would not be published, although Government would be at liberty to make any use of them that it thought proper.

The Government of India believe that only confidential communications will secure frank interchange of opinion, but they are disposed to think that it might be advisable, after matters had been threshed out in confidential consultation, to provide for some public conferences, at any rate on those occasions when the Government desires to make its motives and intentions better known, to correct misstatements, and to remove the erroneous impressions.

PROVINCIAL ADVISORY COUNCILS.

6. The main work of Indian administration, however, is carried on by the various provincial Governments and it appears to the Governor-General in Council desirable that these should in like manner, when the local conditions admit, be furnished with a selected body of advisers, chosen upon a wider basis, whom it should be understood that they would consult upon all measures of importance affecting the populations committed to their charge. The constitution proposed for the Imperial Advisory Council provides for the appointment of members chosen with reference to their status and influence from each of the provinces of British India. These provincial members of the Imperial Council, representing as a rule the great landholders of the province to which they belong, might, it is

thought, with advantage, form the nucleus of a Provincial Advisory Council, which would discharge, in respect of provincial questions, consultative functions similar to those entrusted to the members of the Imperial Council. The Provincial Council would be of smaller size than the Imperial Council, but their membership should be large enough to embrace all interests of sufficient importance to claim representations on such a body. The great landholders would be represented by the Imperial Advisory Councillors, but it is essential that the smaller landholders, industry, commerce, capital and the professional classes, should also be included in the Council, while the association of non-official Europeans, standing for these important interests with the natural leaders of Indian society, in common consultation of matters of public importance, would tend to promote a better understanding, and to clear away on both sides injurious prejudices and misconception. The number required for this purpose might be made up by adding to the Imperial Advisory Councillors, who, as stated above, would represent the landholders, representatives of other important provincial interests, who would be nominated for the Viceroy's approval by the head of the Local Government. Each Local Government should be at liberty to consult its Advisory Council either individually, or collectively in regard to any provincial question. In the former case they would be consulted by letter, and would submit their views in writing. In the latter case they would be specially called together by the head of the province and would tender 'a collective opinion. On such occasions the head of the Government himself or some high official deputed by him for the purpose would preside over their deliberations, and the conclusions arrived at would be recorded by one of the Secretaries to Government, who would attend the meeting for the purpose of furnishing such information as might be required regarding the matters under discussion. The Government of India attach the highest importance to collective deliberation, since the opinions thus obtained are different from, and frequently more valuable than those, elicited by individual consultation.

7. It will be observed that these Advisory Councils are intended to be entirely distinct from the Legislative bodies, whose powers are defined by Statute, and whose functions are restricted to dealing

with measures of legislation laid before them, to discussing the Budget, and to approaching the Government on matters of administration by means of formal interpellations. It may of course happen that members of the Advisory Councils may sit on the Legislative Council, either of the Governor-General or of the Local Government. In their capacity of advisers they will be consulted both on matters on which no legislation is contemplated, and on measures which may eventually assume legislative shape, but the principles and scope of which call for enquiry and deliberation before they are cast into the form of an enactment. This is, in fact, the process now followed; and the object of the Government of India, in proposing the constitution of the new advisory bodies, is to give clearer definition and continuity to methods already partially and occasionally adopted.

ENLARGEMENT OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS.

8. As long ago as May 1889, Lord Lansdowne's Government expressed their opinion—(a) that the opportunities accorded to the Legislative Council of the Governor-General for passing under review the financial situation of the country should occur with regularity and independently of the necessity of the financial legislation in any particular year; and (b) that members of the Council ought to have, under proper safeguards, the right of addressing questions to the Government on matters of public interest. They considered it desirable to extend these two changes of procedure to the provincial Legislative Councils, and they suggested that any changes in the law which might prove to be necessary for this purpose, and in order to enlarge the size and extend the functions of the Councils, should be simultaneously effected both for the Legislative Council of the Governor-General and for the Provincial Legislative Councils. The discussion thus initiated resulted in the passing of the Indian Councils Act of 1892. In forwarding a copy of that Act to the Government of India, the Secretary of State referred briefly to the beneficial results of the Indian Councils Act of 1861, and to the general con-

siderations which justified the enlargement of Legislative Councils, and drew attention to the provision authorising the Governor-General in Council, with the approval of the Secretary of State, to make regulations as to the conditions under which nominations of additional Members should be made, and to prescribe the manner in which those regulations should be carried into effect. He observed that the spread of education and an enlightened public spirit, and the recent organisation of local self-Government, might render it possible to give representation to the views of different races, classes, and localities through the medium of Corporations vested with definite powers upon a recognised administrative basis, or of associations formed upon a substantial community of legitimate interests, professional, commercial, and territorial.

9. When the Councils were thus enlarged and the elective principle was introduced, it was recognised that territorial representation was unsuited to India, but an endeavour was made to constitute the electorates so that all the more important classes and interests should, as far as possible, be represented. In the case of Provincial Councils it is admitted that the results have not justified the expectations formed. The District Boards in particular have conspicuously failed to fulfil the expectation that they would represent the landed interest. Out of 54 members elected by them to the Provincial Councils, only 10 have been landholders, while 36 have been barristers and pleaders. Similarly, out of 43 members elected by the District Municipalities, 40 have been barristers or pleaders and only two landholders. Something has been done by nomination to remedy these defects, but of the 338 non-official members who have been appointed, whether by election or by nomination, to the Provincial Councils, since election was introduced in 1893, as many as 123 or 36 per cent. have been lawyers, and only 77 or 22 per cent. landowners. It is thus apparent that the elective system has given to the legal profession a prominence in the Provincial Councils to which it is not entitled, while it has signally failed to represent other important elements of the community. These shortcomings are reflected in the Legislative Council of the Governor-General, where of the non-official

members nominated or elected since 1893, 27 or 40 per cent. have been lawyers or schoolmasters while the landholders have numbered only 16 or 23.5 per cent. and the mercantile community has been represented by 17 or 25 per cent. The Government of India are far from denying that the professional classes are entitled to a share of representation proportioned not merely to their numbers, which are small, but to their influence which is large and tends continually to increase. But they are not prepared to allow them a virtual monopoly of the power exercised by the Councils, and they believe that the soundest solution of the problem is to be found in supplying the requisite counterpoise to their excessive influence by creating an additional electorate recruited from the landed and moneyed classes.

10. It is the desire of the Governor-General in Council that the Legislative Councils in India should now be enlarged to the fullest extent compatible with the necessary authority of the Government. He desires, moreover, that these bodies should be so constituted in respect of non official members as to give due and ample representation to the different classes and interests of the community. In carrying out this system, which the Government of India agree with Lord Lansdowne's Government in regarding as the only one in any way applicable to Indian conditions, they consider it essential that the Government should always be able to reckon on a numerical majority, and that this majority should be strong enough to be independent of the minor fluctuations that may be caused by the occasional absence of an official member. The principle of a standing majority is accepted by the Government as an entirely legitimate and necessary consequence of the nature of the Paramount Power in India, and so far as they know it has never been disputed by any section of Indian opinion that does not dispute the legitimacy of the Paramount Power itself. That is not an open question, and if two men are not able to wield one sceptre, it is idle to dissemble that fact in constructing political machinery. The question then arises, what number of official members of the requisite standing and experience can, without detriment to the public service, be spared from their regular duties for attendance in Legislative Councils? The enlargement of the Councils is certain to add considerably to protraction of debate, thus entailing larger calls upon the time of their members.

The necessity of maintaining an official majority thus implies the necessity of limiting the number of non-official members ; and the problem which faces the Government of India now, as it faced Lord Lansdowne's Government fifteen years ago, is how to provide for the due representation, within the narrow limits thus imposed, of the vast diversity of classes, races and interests in the Indian Empire.

The Imperial Legislative Council.

II. The most logical and convenient mode of dealing with the question would have been first to discuss and settle the composition, the electorates, and the powers of the Provincial Legislative Councils and then to build up on the basis of these materials a revised constitution for the Imperial Council. That was the procedure followed with great care and thoroughness by Lord Lansdowne's Government, in the years 1889 to 1893, when no single step was taken without the amplest consultation with the Provincial Governments. It may no doubt be said that the scheme set forth below for the enlargement of the Imperial Legislative Council will afford a convenient model for the guidance of the Local Governments in framing their own proposals. This statement, however, is true only to a limited extent. From the nature of the case that scheme makes no provision for the representation of the Municipalities and District Boards, the Universities, the Presidency Corporations, the Trades, Associations, the European planting and industrial interests and Indian commerce, so that in respect of these essential elements of the Provincial Councils it can hardly be said to afford sufficient guidance to Local Governments. The constitution of the Imperial Legislative Council is in fact so closely bound up with that of the Provincial Councils, by which a certain proportion of its members are elected, that it is almost impossible to formulate final proposals for the one without having first determined the character of the other. It must be understood, therefore, that the scheme set forth below for the enlargement of the Legislative Council of the Governor-General is intended to be entirely provisional and suggestive ; that it indicates only the main lines upon which, in the unaided judgment of the Government of India, the extension of the Council

might be effected, and that they reserve to themselves the discretion to modify their proposals in the light of the comments and criticisms which those proposals may elicit from the Local Governments and the public.

12. With these introductory remarks the Government of India pass on to consider how the principle of the representation of classes and interests can be given effect to in the Governor-General's Legislative Council. They suggest that the Council might in future be constituted on the following lines—

(1) The maximum strength of the Council might be 53, or, including the Viceroy, 54.

(2) This number might be made up thus—

A.—Ex-officio, the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal (or of the Punjab when the Council assembles in Simla), the Commander-in- Chief, and the members of Executive Council 				8
B.—Additional officials to be nominated not exceeding 				20
C.—A Ruling Chief to be nominated by the Viceroy 				1
D.—Elected Members —				
(a) by the Chambers of Commerce of Calcutta and Bombay 				2
(b) by the non-official members of the provincial Councils of Madras, Bombay, Bengal, Eastern Bengal and Assam, the United Provinces, the Punjab, and Burma ...				7
(c) by the nobles and the great landowners of Madras, Bombay, Bengal, E. B. and Assam, the United Provinces, the Punjab, and the Central Provinces 				7

(d) by Mahomedans	2
E.—Non-officials nominated by the Viceroy to represent minorities or special interests, not less than 2 to be Mahomedans	4
F.—Experts to be nominated by the Viceroy, when necessary, for special purposes	2
	Total	...	53
or including the Viceroy	54

13. Under the present system four Additional Members are elected by the non-official members of the Councils of Bombay, Madras, Bengal and the United Provinces. The Government of India propose to raise the number to seven by extending the privilege of election to the non-official members of the Councils of Eastern Bengal and Assam, the Punjab, and Burma. The number of non-official members of such Councils will no doubt be materially increased. This will remove the objections which have been taken to entrusting the privilege of election to so important a post as that of Member of the Viceroy's Council to an electorate consisting of only about ten persons.

14. The Government of India are impressed with the necessity for giving substantial representation to the great landholders, who not only constitute the aristocratic and stable elements in Indian society, but also represent the interests of the landlords, great and small. For the purpose of securing the adequate representation of this class, it has been suggested that a list of electors should be formed in each province and that they should be required to elect direct. The precise details of the electorate will require careful consideration, and they will necessarily vary with the circumstances of each province, but the general idea is that a provincial electorate, varying in size from one hundred to one hundred and fifty should be aimed at, and that the amount of land revenue giving the right to vote should not be less than Rs. 10,000 a year. The exact limit to be fixed must of course depend on the status of the landholders in the province concerned. In every case it would be made

a condition that the member elected to represent this class must himself belong to it. Owing to the peculiar conditions of Burma, where there are no large landowners outside the primitive Shan States, that province would be excluded from this category.

15. The question may be raised whether a satisfactory constituency for the purpose of electing a member of the Imperial Legislative Council can be formed by massing together for voting purposes the entire body of land-holders in so large and in many respects so heterogeneous an area as an entire province. It may be thought that an electorate thus constituted would be wanting in solidarity, that it would be apt to fall into the hands of wire-pullers, and that by reason of the incongruous elements which it comprised, it might fail to choose a suitable representative on the Imperial Council. On this point, therefore, the Governor-General in Council reserves judgment until he is in possession of the views of Local Governments. As an alternative solution the suggestion has been made that a representative of the land-holders should be elected to the Imperial Council by the land-holding members of the Provincial Council, either from among their own number or from among land-holders paying the amount of land revenue that may be fixed as giving the right to vote for or to be a member of the Provincial Council. It is also a matter for consideration whether in some provinces representatives of this class, whether on the Provincial or on the Imperial Council, cannot be better obtained by a system of nomination.

16. The last point that remains for consideration under this head relates to the representation of special interests and minorities, and in particular of the Mahomedan community. In this connection I am to invite attention to the observations made by His Excellency the Viceroy in reply to the address presented to him by a large and representative deputation on the 1st. October, 1906. The Government of India concur with the presenters of the address that neither on the Provincial nor on the Imperial Legislative Councils has the Mohamedan community hitherto received a measure of representation commensurate with its numbers and political and historical importance ; and they desire to lay stress upon His Ex-

cellency's observation that "any electoral representation in India would be doomed to mischievous failure which aimed at granting a personal enfranchisement regardless of the beliefs and traditions of the communities composing the population of this continent." Under the system of election hitherto in force, Hindus largely predominate in all or almost all the electorates, with the result that comparatively few Mohamedan members have been elected. These have been supplemented by nominations made by Government. But the total representation thus effected has not been commensurate with the weight to which the Mohamedan community is entitled ; and it has, moreover, been strongly urged that even the system of nomination has frequently failed to secure the appointment of Mohamedans of the class by whom the community desires to be represented.

17. The Government of India suggest, therefore, for the consideration of Local Governments, the adoption of the following measures :—Firstly, in addition to the small number of Mohamedans who may be able to secure election in the ordinary manner, it seems desirable in each of the Councils to assign a certain number of seats to be filled exclusively by Mohamedans. Secondly, for the purpose of filling the latter, or a proportion of them, a special Mohamedan electorate might be constituted consisting of the following classes :—(1) All who pay land revenue in excess of a certain amount. The figure need not be the same in each province ; but should in all cases be sufficiently low to embrace the great body of substantial land-holders. (2) All payers of income tax. This would comprise the trading and professional classes, with incomes exceeding Rs. 1,000 a year. (3) All registered graduates of an Indian University of more than, say, five years' standing. The electoral lists would be prepared on a district basis, and the distribution of seats would be settled by the Local Governments. It would not be necessary, however, to throw open all the seats to election. Indian gentlemen of position sometimes refuse to offer themselves as candidates to a wide electorate, partly because they dislike canvassing, and partly by reason of their reluctance to risk the indignity of being defeated by a rival candidate of inferior social status. For these reasons it would probably be advisable to reserve a proportion of the seats to be filled, as at present, by nomination.

18 In the case of the Governor-General's Council it has been suggested that of the four seats which the Government of India have proposed to set apart for Mohamedans, two should be filled by nomination by the Viceroy. For the other two election by the following provinces in rotation, viz., Bengal, Eastern Bengal and Assam, the United Provinces, the Punjab, Bombay and Madras, is suggested. In Burma and the Central Provinces the proportion of Mohamedans is not large enough to entitle them to special representation. The composition of the electorate in the six provinces mentioned above formed the subject of representations by some prominent members of the Mohamedan deputation which waited upon His Excellency the Viceroy in October, 1906. They proposed that the electorate should be constituted as follows :—(a.) The Mohamedan non-official members of the Provincial Councils as ultimately expanded ; (b) The Mohamedan Fellows of the local University where one exists ; (c) Mohamedans paying income-tax up to an annual income of Rs. 25,000 or paying an amount of land revenue, to be determined for each province separately, which will indicate a corresponding income. The Government of India apprehend that some difficulty may be experienced in compiling a list of voters under the last of these heads, but this is a matter on which they will be guided by the opinion of Local Governments. Should it be found impracticable to compile a register of voters under (c), then they are disposed to think that the electorate should be confined to the Mohamedan non-official members of the Provincial Councils. This proposal is open to the objection that the number of electors will be small ; but it has the merit of being uniform with the system under which the other non-official members are elected by the members of the Provincial Councils.

19. Of the four seats provided for the nomination of non-officials under head E, two would be reserved for Mohamedans, to whom not less than four seats in the Governor-General's Council would thus be definitely appropriated. Inasmuch as in two of the seven provinces with Legislative Councils, viz., Eastern Bengal and Assam and the Punjab, the followers of this religion constitute a majority of the population, it seems possible that a certain number

of Mohamedans may also be returned to the Council under Sub-Head (b) of Head D.

PROVINCIAL LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS.

20. The foregoing scheme for the Imperial Legislative Council necessarily omits several elements which may form part of the Provincial Councils. Having regard to the wide variety of conditions in different parts of India, it is improbable that any one scheme will prove to be equally adapted to all provinces. For instance, the principle of having recourse to election may be distasteful to the landed classes in some provinces, while in others, where it has become familiar, it may be accepted without objection. The general principle to be borne in mind is as already stated, that the widest representation should be given to classes, races, and interests subject to the condition that an official majority must be maintained.

21. At present the larger number of the elected members of the Provincial Council, who again constitute the majority of the electorate for the Imperial Council, are chosen by Municipalities and District Boards. The Government of India have examined the franchises which have been framed for these bodies, and they find that the qualifications required both for electors and for candidates are extraordinarily low. Thus, in all but three of the mofussil towns of Bengal, any one who pays Rs. 1-8 a year in rates is entitled to vote in the election of Municipal Commissioners, and is, himself, eligible for membership, not only of the Municipal Committee, but also of the Provincial Legislative Council; while anyone who pays Re. 1 a year as road-cess may take part in the elections for the Local Boards, who in their turn elect the members of the District Boards. This is the franchise upon which the election of the Bengal members, not only of the Provincial, but also in large degree of the Imperial Council rests ultimately, though not immediately. And in the other provinces the qualifications are of much the same order of magnitude. These franchises were primarily devised with a view not to election of Councils, but to the management of local affairs; and their unsuitability, as a foundation for the election of legislators

seems to have escaped notice in 1893. The Government of India do not propose to withdraw from District Boards and Municipalities the privilege of election to the Provincial Councils which they have enjoyed for the last fourteen years. But it does not follow that the present system of voting must be maintained unchanged, and a solution might perhaps be arrived at by introducing special qualifications for members of Council while leaving the electoral franchise in other respects unchanged.

22. It would be well also to consider whether in view of the constitution of Indian society, it would not be advisable to introduce some such system for the representation of classes now liable to be crowded out by any predominant section of the population, as has already been admitted to be necessary in the case of Mohomedans. The Government of India do not wish to impose upon Provincial Governments any special line of action in making proposals with this object, but they desire to draw attention to the following scheme which has been suggested to them for the due representation of classes in local Councils and Boards :—

(a) The Local Government shall determine how many seats are to be filled by elected representatives of the most important classes into which the population of the province is divided by race, caste, or religion, and shall allot these seats to the several classes.

(b) For the election of representatives of each class the Local Governments shall publish a list of voters consisting of members of that class, who have held or are holding office in the Municipal or Local Boards, supplemented by others whom the Governments may nominate after consultation with the *Anjumans*, *Panchayats* or other bodies who have been constituted by the class in question for the direction of its own affairs.

(c) As the constitutions of the provincial Councils must largely depend upon the Municipal and Local Boards, it is suggested that the Local Governments should introduce into their systems of election and nominations for these Boards, the principle of assigning a fixed

proportion of seats to each of the leading classes into which the population is divided by race, caste, or religion, and permitting the members of that class to select its own representative. In the Municipalities of Rangoon and Mandalay, and to a limited extent in certain Municipalities in the United Provinces, this principle of class representation has been adopted with successful results. In the case of District and Local Boards it might perhaps be possible to distribute the seats to be filled by election among occupational groups such as landholders, cultivators, traders, and professional men, and to select certain castes as representing each group. The literate members of those castes who paid a certain sum in taxes or possess certain property qualifications might then be empowered to elect one of their own number to represent the occupational group on the Board. Suppose, for example, that in a particular area eight members had to be elected to serve on the Local Board, four seats might be allotted to the Mohamedans if their number were large enough to entitle them to this proportion, and the remaining four distributed among the Hindus, so that one seat should be given to the landholders, one to the traders, one to the cultivators, and one to the artisans. The census statistics supplemented by local enquiries would afford the means of determining what caste should be selected for the purpose of electing a member for each of these groups, and only literate persons belonging to those castes and having certain property qualifications would be entitled to vote in the electoral group to which their caste had been assigned and to elect a representative possessing similar qualifications from one of the castes so assigned. It seems probable that by some plan of this kind the voting power might be distributed over a wider circle than at present, and would be less liable to become concentrated in the hands of a single section of the community. The same object might be attained, without making use of the caste organisation, by simply forming electoral groups on the basis of the four classes specified above and fixing for each group a distinct and appropriate franchise. For landholders the qualification might be the payment of a certain sum in the form of land revenue or cesses ; for cultivators a certain rental ; for traders and professional men so much income tax. In each case the electors

ought to be literate, and they should be required to elect from among their own group.

DISCUSSION ON THE BUDGET IN THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL.

23. The discursive and unfruitful character of the Budget debates, both in the Imperial and Provincial Councils, has on many occasions formed the subject of comment and criticism. The Government of India entirely recognise the defects of the practice which prevails under the existing regulations, and they are anxious to introduce such changes as will make the debates less unreal and will bring them into closer relation with the financial policy and administrative decisions of the Government. To this end they propose that the Budget should be discussed, in the first instance, by separate heads, or groups of heads, which would be explained severally by the member in administrative charge, this discussion being followed by a general debate in which members would enjoy the same freedom as at present of criticising the administration. This change would evidently involve an extension of the time now allotted to the discussion, and it would afford a far better opportunity for systematic criticism than exists under present arrangements. These compel a Member of Council to include within the limits of a single speech all the observations that he has to offer on any of the numerous subjects that naturally present themselves in an annual review of the administration of the revenues of India. Remarks made in the course of the ampler and more practical discussion which is now contemplated would be borne in mind by the Government of India or the Local Government when making financial arrangements in subsequent years, and it might perhaps on occasion be found possible to alter the budget actually under review.

24. These are the provisional and tentative proposals which, with the approval of His Majesty's Government, the Governor-General in Council now lays before you in the fullest confidence that they will receive the careful scrutiny and sympathy

the consideration that their high importance demands. I am to request that after consultation with important bodies and individuals representative of the various classes of the community, the Local Government will submit its matured conclusions to the Government of India on each branch of the subject, together with a detailed statement of the alterations that you desire to make in the Council Regulations in order to carry his proposals into effect.

25. I am to ask that a reply to this letter may be received by the Government of India not later than 1st March, 1908.

(Sd.) H. A. STUART.

APPENDIX D.

From Rai Rajkumar Sarvathikari, Bahadur, Secretary, British Indian Association, to the Hon'ble C. W. Bolton, C.S.I., Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal. No. 47, Calcutta, the 5th July, 1898.

I am directed by the Committee of the British Indian Association to submit, in continuation of my letter No. 40, dated the 30th April, 1898, for the consideration and orders of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor, the following observations regarding the regulations, framed by His Excellency the Governor-General in Council under Section I (4) of the Indian Council Act, 1892, and published in the *Gazette of India*, dated the 18th of March, 1893.

2. The Committee beg to submit a scheme which, they are confident, will be found to secure the genuine political representation on the Legislative Council of all classes whom it is possible to represent, and which will admit hereafter of extension to District Boards and Municipalities.

3. It is possible to represent only two classes in India—the propertied classes subject to a certain minimum of taxation and the educated classes. The mass of the agricultural population is not educated or intelligent enough to be able to comprehend the idea of representation at all. The bulk of the residents of towns is no

better. Recent experience in Calcutta and Bombay brings out very clearly the low level of intelligence that prevails in the towns.

4. Any system of representation, that is to succeed in India, must be graduated so as to give the real leaders of the people the influence which they are entitled to claim and which they alone can exercise in support of the Government. For the purpose of election to the Council the only possible tests of influence are taxation and education. The Scheme which the Committee propose gives its due weight to both these tests. It will, the Committee believe, induce the leading members of the propertied classes to take that place in the public business which has been denied to them under the rules hitherto in force ; while on the other hand the educational franchise suggested will give the educated middle class as full a measure of representation as their position deserves.

5. The Committee would take the district as the lowest unit of representation. In each district the Magistrate should prepare a list of taxpayers who pay, directly or indirectly, Rs. 1,000 per annum in revenue or taxes of any kind. He should then divide this list into three classes, each of which pays one-third of the aggregate taxation taken into consideration for the purpose. The first class should include those tax-payers who pay the highest amounts of individual taxation, the second those who pay the next highest, and the third the remainder paying a minimum of Rs. 1,000. Suppose for example that, in a given district, the aggregate taxes taken into consideration was Rs. 90,000 which was paid by 48 persons, of whom 6 paid 5,000 each, 12 paid 2,500 each, and 30 paid 1,000 each. The arrangement for voting purposes would be that shown in the following Statement :—

AGGREGATE OF TAXATION FORMING BASIS OF REPRESENTATION.

Rs. 90,000		
I	II	III
1st class Rs. 30,000 comprising 6 voters who pay respectively Rs. 5,000	2nd class Rs. 30,000 comprising 12 voters who pay respectively Rs. 2,500	3rd class Rs. 30,000 comprising 30 voters who pay respectively Rs. 1,000

Each of these classes would vote separately and each class would elect *one* district Elector.

This would give three district Electors representing the propertied classes in proportion to the stake in the country which each class may be assumed to possess on the strength of its share in the burden of taxation.

6. The Committee would propose to add a fourth class representing the educated section of the community. This class should include (1) Judicial and Executive Officers, active or retired; (2) Lawyers, Doctors and Engineers who have duly graduated; (3) Inspectors, Professors and Head Masters of Colleges and Schools affiliated to an Indian University; (4) Masters and Bachelors of Arts of an Indian or English University; (5) Editors of Newspapers, written in English or vernacular. They should all be of at least five years' standing.

7. In the case of all classes the age-limit should be 24.

8. The Committee would divide the Province into a certain number of Electoral Circles, each circle comprising a certain number of districts. Each class of Electors, in a given Circle, representing the different districts would elect one representative. This would give four representatives for all the districts. These four would form, what may be called, the Central Council. The final election to the Legislative Council would rest with this body.

Suppose for example that in a given Circle, there are 11 districts. They would give 11 Electors of each class, who would represent all the districts. These 11 Electors of each class, would separately elect *one* representative for the Central Council, which would elect a member of the Legislative Council. This would be shown by the following Statement.

ELECTORAL CIRCLE COMPRISING 11 DISTRICTS.

I		II		III		IV	
11 1st class	Electors	11 2nd class	Electors	11 3rd class	Electors	11 4th class	Electors
elect		elect		elect		elect	
1 representative		1 representative		1 representative		1 representative	
for		for		for		for	
Central Council.		Central Council		Central Council.		Central Council.	

The Central Council composed of these four representatives would elect a member of the Legislative Council.

9. To avoid a tie, the President, for the time being, may be granted one casting vote. In case the Commissioner of the Circle, nominated for the purpose, presides, he may be granted one vote with the sanction of the Local Government.

10. The qualifications for election to the Legislative Council of a fourth class candidate should be payment of Rs. 1,000 per annum, in taxes of any kind. This may be relaxed in favour of candidates of exceptional ability, knowledge and experience, whose services in the Council are likely to be of advantage to the Province.

11. The Committee have already prayed that, considering the importance of the work done by the British Indian Association, and the important interests it represents, the privilege of nominating one member of the Legislative Council may be granted to the Association. His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor has reserved to himself the power of making nominations to a certain number of seats. One of these seats, the Committee pray again, may be granted to the British Indian Association.

I have the honor to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

RAJKUMAR SARVADHIKARI,

Secretary, British Indian Association.

A SCHEME FOR REPRESENTATION.

1. Elective franchise is to be given to the propertied classes and the educated classes in proportion corresponding to their relative importance.*

2. The Province is to be divided into a certain number of electoral circles each circle comprising a certain number of districts.

3. The district is to be taken as the lowest unit of representation.

4. The propertied men in each district are to be divided into three classes, each paying, directly, or indirectly, one-third of the aggregate taxation including land revenue and cesses. The educated section of the community of a certain standing is to form the fourth class. Each class would select an Elector to represent it. This will give four Electors to each district representing the four classes. (See Statement A.)

5. The qualification for a vote in the first three classes is to be payment of Rs. 1,000, per annum, in land revenue or taxes of any kind.

Age-limit in all the classes is to be 24 years.

6. Each class of Electors in a given circle representing the different districts would select one representative. The four representatives of the four classes form the Central Electoral Council. This Council elects a member of the Legislative Council. (See Statement B.)

7. The qualification for a fourth class candidate for election to the Legislative Council is payment of Rs. 1,000 per annum in taxes of any kind. This might be relaxed in favour of candidates of exceptional merit.

*NOTE—The proportion corresponding to the relative importance of the two classes may be ascertained by the following tests.

THE FIRST TEST

relates to the stake in the country which each class may be assumed to possess on the strength of its share in the burden of taxation.

(1) The propertied classes pay—

Land Revenue	...	Rs. 3,89,49,399
Road and P. W. Cesses	...	86,17,916
Total	...	4,75,67,315

(2) The educated classes along with trading classes and others pay—

Income Tax	...	Rs. 42,48,058
Municipal Taxes	...	68,54,449
Total	...	1,11,02,507

(See *Administration Report 1896-97 App. C. p. vii.*)

We find the propertied classes pay more than four times as much as the educated classes. If a quarter of the amount paid by the former is left out for purposes of adjustment we still find that the ratio of taxes paid is more than 3 : 1.

THE SECOND TEST

relates to the numerical proportion of the two classes.

The number of estates paying land revenue above Rs. 50 per annum is 83,09 (*See Land Revenue Report, 1896-97 p. 65.*)

The number of educated men including graduates in Arts, Law, Medicine and Engineering is 12,439.

(*See University Minutes, 1896-97. p. 482.*)

We thus find the ratio of propertied men to educated men is 7 : 1 nearly.

If for purposes of adjustment the estates paying above Rs. 50 and below Rs. 1,000 per annum, and the group of estates owned by the same owner, be left out, there would still remain about 40,000 estates.

This would give 3 : 1 as the ratio of propertied men to educated men.

THE THIRD TEST

relates to the occupation of the two classes.

"The figures given at p. 276 Vol. III of Mr. O'Donnell's Census Report for Bengal, show the rural population of Bengal to number 67,903,111 of which 44,510,936 or 65·5 per cent. are counted under class B. Order V. as being employed in agriculture. To this should be added the rural labourers numbering (p. 283) 7,883,380, which raises the proportion of agriculturists to 77·1 per cent. Even this really understates the case, for the simple reason that people whose caste-occupation is non-agricultural but who also cultivate, are not to be recorded as non-agriculturists." (Extract from letter No. 230 I. M., dated 31st August, 1895, from Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Municipal Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department.)

We find here the proportion of agriculturists and non-agriculturists is 77·1 and 22·9 per cent respectively. The ratio of agriculturists is thus more than 3 : 1.

If the entire Provincial population, 71,346,987, is taken, we find that the number of agriculturists is 45,537,923. If to this is added the number of rural labourers, and the large number of men coming under the heads "Personal service," "Food and drink," "Dress," "Ornament," "General," &c., in the Census Report, the ratio of agriculturists to non-agriculturists will be much larger than 3 : 1.

If the propertied men be taken to represent the agriculturists, and the educated men, the non-agriculturists, (a large number of whom may be represented by both classes) the ratio of 3 : 1 may fairly be assumed to be correct.

STATEMENT A.

AGGREGATE OF TAXATION FORMING BASIS OF REPRESENTATION.


(for example.)

Rs. 90,000		
I	II	III
1st class Rs. 30,000 comprising 6 voters who pay respectively Rs. 5,000	2nd class Rs. 30,000 comprising 12 voters who pay respectively Rs. 2,500	3rd class Rs. 30,000 comprising 30 voters who pay respectively Rs. 1,000

STATEMENT B.

ELECTORAL CIRCLE COMPRISING 11 DISTRICTS.

I	II	III	IV
11 1st class Electors elect 1 representative for Central Council.	11 2nd class Electors elect 1 representative for Central Council.	11 3rd class Electors elect 1 representative for Central Council.	11 4th class Electors elect 1 representative for Central Council.





16 JUL 1958



